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III. ABSTRACT 
 
User fees are in place in most Sub-Saharan African countries since the 80’s 
and have been extended to maternal healthcare services. However, the effects of 
these type out-of-pocket payments in contexts where poverty deeply affects women’s 
purchasing power are not yet clear and major difficulties arise when choosing 
sustainable financial systems for maternal healthcare in low income settings. 
This dissertation asks for the purpose of user fees for maternal care in low 
resource settings and is based on a literature review. While the research took place, a 
dynamic table was created to store, describe and code each of the articles, which 
resulted into: (1) a major classification of the arguments pro and against user fees; (2) 
a description of the alternative mechanism for financing maternal care in low income 
settings; (3) a scheme of patterns and recommendations for implementation of different 
healthcare financing mechanism in low income regions; (4) a model of analysis 
regarding the effect of cultural barriers on the demand for formal maternal healthcare in 
low income settings; (5) a model of analysis regarding the mix of mechanisms for 
financing maternal health in low income settings; and (6) a project proposal for a 
deeper future exploration of “the influence of price in the demand for maternal 
healthcare among different cultural contexts in low income settings”.  
User fees can be harmful in a context were women are very poor and where 
healthcare services, like maternal care, have suboptimal levels of consumption. 
Therefore, when asking for what are the alternatives to out-of-pocket expenses 
demand side approaches must be considered (like voucher schemes, community 
insurance, cash transfers and loan funds), as well as supply side approaches (like 
reimbursement schemes, cost-effectiveness analysis, etc.) and as other set of 
interrelated tools (like improving management skills, refining information systems, 
adopting anti-corruption measures, investing in project design, and promoting 
community participation in decision making processes).  
Still, all these tools may fail if context is not taken into account. Therefore, the 
search for the right solution has to be preceded by a comprehensive analysis of the 
context and an identification of the problem. It is necessary to understand the cause for 
the lack of demand for maternal healthcare and keep in mind that the reasons for the 
arousal of the problem may be different from community to community. 
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IV. RESUMO 
 
As taxas moderadoras estão implementadas na maioria dos países da África 
Subsariana, estendendo-se aos cuidados de saúde materna. Todavia, as 
consequências das taxas ao utilizador na saúde materna, em contextos onde a 
pobreza afecta profundamente o poder de compra das mulheres, não são claras e 
colocam-se grandes dificuldades em determinar quais os mecanismos financeiros que 
melhor se adequam.  
Esta dissertação pergunta assim “qual o propósito das taxas moderadoras para 
a saúde materna em regiões de baixo rendimento?”, recorrendo para tal a uma de 
revisão de literatura. Ao longo do processo de pesquisa, foi criada uma tabela 
dinâmica com o intuito de armazenar, descrever e codificar cada um dos artigos que 
teve como resultados: (1) uma ampla classificação dos argumentos a favor e contra as 
taxas moderadoras; (2) uma descrição dos mecanismos alternativos ao financiamento 
da saúde materna em contextos de baixo rendimento; (3) a construção de um 
esquema de padrões e recomendações para a implementação dos diferentes 
mecanismos de financiamento em regiões de baixo rendimento; (4) a criação de um 
modelo de análise e decisão que permite a escolha de conjuntos de mecanismos 
financeiros adaptados ao contexto; (5) a elaboração de uma proposta de projecto para 
explorar a influência do preço na procura por cuidados de saúde materna em 
diferentes contextos culturais de regiões de baixo rendimento.  
As taxas moderadoras podem ser prejudiciais em contextos de pobreza onde 
os serviços de saúde, como é o caso dos serviços de saúde materna, se caracterizam 
por baixos níveis de consumo. Quando se pergunta que alternativas existem aos 
pagamentos do utilizador, devem ser consideradas abordagens do lado da procura 
(ex.: seguros comunitários, vouchers, transferências monetárias, etc.), do lado da 
oferta (ex.: políticas de reembolso, análises de custo-efectividade, etc.) e outras 
ferramentas interrelacionadas (ex.: melhorar as competências de gestão e os sistemas 
de informação, adoptar medidas anticorrupção, investir no design dos projectos, 
promover a participação da comunidade, etc.). Contudo, todas estas ferramentas 
podem falhar caso o contexto não seja levado em conta. Assim sendo, a procura pela 
solução mais acertada deve ser precedida de uma análise detalhada do contexto que 
permita compreender mais aprofundadamente as causas da falta de procura de 
cuidados de saúde materna em regiões de baixo rendimento e encontrar soluções 
adaptadas para cada comunidade. 
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V. INTRODUCTION   
 
 [Theme]  This dissertation deals with the issue of user fees for maternal health 
care in Sub-Saharan African.  
[Object: Why Maternal Health]  Approximately 1000 women die, per day, as a 
result of obstetric complications and about 20 times more suffer injuries, infection and 
disabilities after childbirth (UNICEF, 2011, 2012b). At the same time, around 8000 
babies die daily at less than 28 days (UNICEF, 2012e) and these deaths and 
disabilities are not equality distributed around the world.  
Having healthy women and newborns is a key to success for any society as this 
increases family well-being and overall life expectancy (Filippi V et al., 2006; The World 
Bank, 2012; WHO, 2005). What is more, mortality and morbidity of mothers and babies 
has a multiplicity of implications in terms of costs. First it represents a loss of human 
capital and productivity. Second, the demand for health care entails, among other 
things, transportation expenses, medicines, payments for the utilization of services and 
food during the treatment, which affect household finances, leaving less money 
available for the rest of the family and consequently for the health and welfare of the 
remaining adults and children in the household. Thirdly, the deterioration of maternal 
and child health is culturally and psychologically costly, since families are not prepared 
to deal with such tragedies and it is noteworthy that even the obstetric implications may 
also interfere with the behaviour of women and their families when it comes to 
decisions on fertility, allocation of time and resources, child care, nutrition and 
education (Islam M & Gerdthan U, 2004; Jowett M, 2000; WHO, 2005).  
In terms of poverty reduction and equality, maternal and newborns health 
(perinatal health) has a large number of positive externalities: maternal health 
contributes to women’s and physical and psychological strengthening and increases 
their empowerment and ability to deal with inequality; improving perinatal health 
reduces the weight of the expenditure on the poorest families, nullifies the effect of 
mortality and morbidity in productivity and reduces the gap between rich and poor. 
Finally, good reproductive health care contributes to reducing the impact of infectious 
diseases, allows treatment to prevent malaria in mothers and babies and prevents 
transmission of IVH / AIDS and other diseases (Filippi V et al., 2006). Thus, more than 
an aspiration itself maternal and new-borns health must be understood as a hyper 
conductive state of collective health and as a force in economic and social 
development (WHO, 2005).  
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[Why Maternal Health in Sub-Saharan Africa] Maternal care is not only an 
important marker of the effectiveness of health systems. It is a strong indicator of a 
country level of economic and social development. Yet, of all the regions of the world, 
Sub-Saharan Africa alone accounts for about half of maternal deaths and has the 
highest neonatal mortality rate (Stanton C, Lawn J, Rahman H, Wilczynska-Ketende K, 
& Hill K, 2006; UNICEF, 2012c, 2012d).  For the Sub-Saharan region it is therefore 
urgent to find solutions that stimulate both supply and demand of effective maternal 
health care.  
[Problem] User fees are in place in most Sub-Saharan African countries (James 
C, Morris S, Taylor A, & Keith R, 2005) and are extended to maternal health care. Yet, 
the effects of user fees in these settings, where poverty deeply affects women’s 
purchasing power are not yet clear. One of the major difficulties that arise is finding to 
design a system of financial transfers that can be sustainable.  
[Research Question] This poses a question: “What is the purpose of user fees 
for the use of perinatal care in low resource settings across Sub-Saharan Africa?”   
[Specific Questions] In this study we try to answer this and to understand if user 
fees are an appropriate tool for improving the demand for maternal health in Sub-
Saharan Africa; to understand the consequences of user fees in terms of efficiency, 
revenue and equity; to acknowledge the impact of user fees in maternal health care 
supply; and to compare user fees with other mechanisms of financing maternal health 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
[Specific objectives] In order to address these questions we started by a 
conceptual analysis where we defined user fees and how they are implemented. Then 
we analysed how user fees are related with microeconomics theory and, specifically, 
how they affect consumers’ and (and to a lesser extent supplier’s) behaviour. 
Subsequently we searched for the context of user fees in low resource settings, 
exploring their strengths and weaknesses. In a fourth step we compared these 
arguments to the reality of maternal health care, and analysed specific challenges 
imposed by maternal health care. In a fifth step we describe some experiences of 
removing user fees in maternal health in African and non-African settings. And finally 
we described alternative mechanisms for financing maternal health care in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
[Pertinence] A body of research emerges from this study which is able to help 
other researchers see the full picture of maternal health user fees in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and to expand academic knowledge. Because this thesis is integrated in the 
masters  “History, International Relations and Cooperation” it enriches the discussion of 
these themes with intercultural concerns, and integrates a conceptual health 
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economics framework within a historical analysis, thus contributing to an enlarged 
understanding of what are and have been the foundations of the maternal health user 
fees mechanism in these particular settings. In addition, this is a research in which 
practical solutions are discussed with a view to improving maternal healthcare in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
The method adopted to store data ensured efficient and consistent articulation 
of information. The systematic method adopted for classifying and organizing articles 
led me to a clear scheme of patterns and recommendations that per se resulted in an 
innovative and comprehensive model of analysis of the effect of cultural barriers on the 
demand for formal maternal healthcare in rural Sub-Saharan Regions. In addition, not 
only is demonstrated how the suggested model could be used to study specific 
contexts through a practical example; as it is explained the value of such kind of 
approaches for studding the potential mixes of mechanisms for financing maternal 
health care in low income settings.  
While most of the studies produce sets of recommendations adapted to a 
specific financial mechanism, the objective of this study consisted in gathering 
recommendations from all different schemes in order to produce a new methodology. 
The presented thesis also resulted into a project proposal in the field developed for a 
deeper future exploration of the impact of financial mechanisms in the demand for 
maternal healthcare in Low and Middle income countries. Ultimately, this research 
provides a learning base for undertaking further studies. 
[Limitations] As a novice researcher the approach used to the identification, 
critique and articulation of the literature may not have been as thorough as that of more 
experienced researchers. Time constraints did not allow exploring the available 
literature more extensively. Resource constraints limited the thesis to a theoretical 
discussion, which would have benefited from experience in the field. 
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VI. METHODOLOGY  
 
The methodology adopted for this study was based on a literature review 
undertaken from 5 May 2012 to 25 September 2012.  
[Identifying the research topic]  In order to identify the research question it was 
first defined a research topic relevant to the programme of this Master’s, to my 
Bachelors background, and to my professional experience. After studying economics, I 
worked as a volunteer in Kenya, and since my aspiration is to work in the field of 
international health cooperation, the issue of maternal health care costs in Sub-
Saharan Africa called my attention. While exploring literature and during the peer 
discussions a question kept coming into my mind – the cost to whom? Cost differs from 
consumer to supplier’s perspective. While exploring the cost of maternal care for 
supply, it the study faced the problem of missing data. Therefore focusing on a 
consumer perspective seemed to be the best option. Later it became clear that given 
the financial limitations of doing  field research it would be more feasible to centre the 
discussion on out-of-pocket health expenditure in the form of official payments, instead 
of covering all types of demand costs like unofficial payments, transportation costs, 
opportunity costs, etc. Then building the exact question was easy – I always like to 
know why things exist in the first place.   
[Inclusion criteria] Inclusion and exclusion criteria were established to identify 
the literature that addressed the research question and the literature which did not. The 
review included primary and secondary published literature as well as unpublished 
literature in the English language only. The thematic selection of articles was made 
using the following criteria: theoretical foundations of user fees; health care user fees; 
analysis related to health user fees in Low and Middle Income Countries  and in Africa; 
analysis related to Maternal health in Low and Middle Income Countries  and in Africa; 
general analysis of the importance or experience of user fees in maternal health; and 
recommendations or alternative mechanisms for financing health or maternal health in 
low income settings.  
[Exclusion Criteria] Primary and secondary research not related to the topics 
above was excluded as well as non-English literature. 
 [Set of Keywords] To search the above topics, sets of keywords, refined during 
the research process, were designed and combined together as can be seen in Figure 
1. The key words used are listed below. For example, in search (1) we searched for 
articles that had at least one of the following expressions: user fees, user charges out 
of pocket, copayment or copayments were. In search 2 we looked for articles that had 
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[User fee(s) OR user charge(s) OR out-of-pocket(s) OR 
user fee(s) OR copay(ments)] 
 
1 
AND [Africa OR Sub-Saharan OR low income countries 
developing countries] 
[User fee(s) OR user charge(s) OR out-of-pocket(s) OR 
user fee(s) OR copay(ments)] 
 2 
AND [Health OR healthcare] 
AND [Africa OR Sub-Saharan OR low income countries 
OR developing countries] 
[User fee(s) OR user charge(s) OR out-of-pocket(s) OR 
user fee(s) OR copay(ments)] 
 
3 
AND [Health OR healthcare] 
[User fee(s) OR user charge(s) OR out-of-pocket(s) OR 
user fee(s) OR copay(ments)] 
 
4 
AND [Maternal or obstetric or reproductive] 
 
[User fee(s) OR user charge(s) OR out-of-pocket(s) OR 
user fee(s) OR copay(ments)] 
 
5 
AND [Maternal or obstetric or reproductive] 
AND [Africa OR Sub-Saharan OR low income countries 
developing countries] 
[User fee(s) OR user charge(s) OR out-of-pocket(s) OR 
user fee(s) OR copay(ments)] 
 
6 
at least one of those expressions combined with least one of the following expressions: 
Africa, Sub-Saharan, low income countries or developing countries. 
 
Figure 1: Set of keywords 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another set of key words was used to gather specific information on policies 
that are alternatives to user fees. The key words where searched  for the specific 
policies, by searching for: [voucher OR conditional cash transfer] AND/OR [vouchers 
OR conditional cash transfers] AND/OR [maternal or obstetric or reproductive] AND/OR 
[health OR healthcare]. 
[Data Sources] Six specific databases, namely Pubmed, Science Direct, 
Medline, SocIndex, Academic Search and Econlit, and a web browser, Google, were 
used to collect the articles reviewed. Additional articles were also collected through 
reference citation and suggestions of experts from the Institute of Public Health, The 
Department of Economics and the Centre of African Studies of The University of Porto. 
 [Data Organization]While the research took place, an excel data base was 
created to store and classify each of the articles (please consult the excel file in the 
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CD). Firstly, a number was given to each article, which was classified according to its 
reference, date, objective, method and results. Secondly, articles were classified 
according to their type, if primary or secondary literature. Thirdly, a set of 4 thematic 
categories were defined: articles related to the theory of user fees were labelled as 
“Theory”; articles describing the experience of user fees in Africa were labelled as 
“Africa”; articles describing the experience of user fees in Low and Middle Income 
Countries outside Africa were labelled as “LMI Countries”; and articles describing the 
experience of user fees in maternal health were labelled as “Maternal Health”. Table 1 
shows the number of articles reviewed for each category, out of a total of 144 articles. 
 
Finally, a major classification was developed taking into account the arguments 
defended by the authors.  For example, articles discussing the theme of user fees 
(theme A) received a binary code (number 1)  and gathered in subgroups like (1) 
articles in favour of user fees; (2) articles with arguments against user fees; (3) 
experiences and opinions on the abolition of user fees, etc. Subgroups received the 
same binary treatment and afterwards they 1s and 0s were counted, as can be seen in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Number of Articles per Classification Criteria 
 
Criteria Nº of 
articles 
A. User Fees 
 
1. Arguments in favour of user fees  8 
2. Arguments against user fees 27 
3. Experiences and opinions on the abolition of user fees 23 
3.1. Citations on the advantages of removal of user fees 7 
a) Gains political support 1 
b) Reduces administration costs 1 
c) Makes services affordable 3 
d) Reduces delays in seeking cash 1 
e) Protects against indebtness 1 
f) More equitable revenue 2 
g) Increases service use by poor people 7 
h) Avoids need for exemption 1 
3.2. Citations on the disadvantages of removal of user fees 8 
a) Less Revenue 5 
b) Less quality 1 
c) Risk of informal charges 3 
Table 1.  Number of articles reviewed for each category 
Year Type of 
literature 
Theme Total 
1
9
6
0
s
 
1
9
7
0
s
 
1
9
8
0
s
 
1
9
9
0
s
 
2
0
0
0
s
 
2
0
1
0
s
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e
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2 1 1 36 72 32 106 36 23 40 64 59 144 
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d) Disrespect for the informal system 1 
e) Does not protect from other costs 2 
f) Health staff workload 3 
g) Low availability of drugs and medical supplies 2 
h) Need of Funding 2 
i) Does not end inequality 1 
j) Implementation process 3 
4. Recommendations the abolition of user fees  9 
5. Articles that suggest complementary interventions to user fees 12 
6. Articles that discuss user fees in emergency situations 8 
7. Descriptions of the impact of fees in the education sector 12 
8. Articles which state user fees were introduced in the 80s 21 
a) Ability to pay and equality  31 
b) Administrative costs  1 
c) Low efficiency 3 
d) Quality 10 
e) Revenue 10 
f) Utilization  11 
g) Central collection of revenue 2 
h) Local collection of revenue 2 
B. Alternative 
mechanisms for 
financing 
maternal health 
1. Pre-payment 3 
2. Community insurance 11 
3. Conditional cash transfers 16 
4. Voucher schemes 19 
5. Schemes for financing transport 7 
6. Private insurance 9 
7. Contracting 8 
8. Equity funds 9 
9. Voucher schemes 17 
10. Universal coverage 16 
11. Tax revenue 12 
12. Social Health Insurance 17 
13.  Insurance in general 22 
14. Public private partnerships 15 
15. Subsidies 20 
16. Social franchising 18 
C. Other 
Considerations 
1. Higher funding 3 
2. Leakage/corruption 5 
3. Health Resources 4 
4. Referral System 6 
5. Availability of Drugs 14 
6. Informal fees 20 
7. Articles stating that user fees are not the only barrier to the demand for health care 21 
8. Articles stating that context matters 23 
9. Articles describing the presence or the concept of moral hazard 12 
10. Articles explaining what is adverse selection 11 
11. Importance of improving maternal health 14 
 
 
[Terminology] In order to simplify this analysis, due to extreme pertinence of the 
international debate on the concept of development, we will refer to Africa, Asia and the 
Pacific (excluding Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the member States of CIS in 
Asia), Latin America and the Caribbean as Low and Middle Income Countries and to 
Europe, excluding the European transition economies, Canada, The United States of 
America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand as High Income Countries. The terms 
“user fees”, “out-of-pocket expenditure/expenses” and “user charges” will be taken as 
synonyms, as well as the terms “Maternal Health” and “Reproductive Health” 
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VII. RESULTS 
 
 
1. Definition of user fees 
 
A user fee is a financial contribution of the user, made at the point of service, 
each time he/she uses health care. It is a share of the total expense for consultations, 
examinations or hospitalizations that, by imposing a financial contribution to the user, 
limits the “moral hazard”, controlling an eventual excess of demand.  
“Moral hazard” is the consumption of health care even when total cost of the 
service exceeds benefits. In 1963 Kenneth Arrow (1963) described this phenomenon, 
arguing that it was a non-efficient behaviour and outlined an argument for public 
intervention in the healthcare sector (Arrow K, 1963).  
In response Mark Pauly (1968) demonstrated that it was fully rational to 
consume more health care if a person is not paying for it (Pauly M, 1968). Because 
healthcare consumers do not pay for the total cost of the service, but only for a share of 
it (or nothing at all), price can be considered zero and at a zero price the consumption 
of health care is infinite, which pose an unbearable burden on suppliers. User fees, by 
limiting consumers' use of the services, were therefore seen as way to solve this 
problem by forcing people to pay a positive for the healthcare they consume.  
In 1974 the “RAND experiment” empirically supported the theory that the costs 
of moral hazard exceed its benefit causing a welfare loss to society (Manning W et al., 
1987; Newhouse JP, 1974; Nyman, 2007). Since the 70’s, user fees, even user fees in 
the form of effective and appropriate hospital procedures, has been understood as a 
mechanism that could reduce moral hazard and unnecessary health care use 
substantially using cost-sharing policies with little or no measurable effect on health 
(Manning W et al., 1987; Newhouse JP, 1974; Nyman, 2007). In other words, 
copayments were understood as important in controlling excess demand, without 
reducing necessary health care. 
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2. How user fees affect consumer behaviour  
 
Several factors are able to influence demand and effect of user fees on 
consumer behaviour. Aspects such as average income, size of the market, availability 
of substitute goods, tastes, preferences and special influences affect the decision of 
any consumer (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2005).  
Poor people are especially vulnerable during pregnancy (Borghi, Ensor, 
Somanathan, Lissner, & Mills, 2006); cheaper alternatives to institutional maternal 
health care are widely available; tradition, religion and cultural beliefs interfere with 
women’s decision to seek care; and rural Sub-Saharan women frequently  have to deal 
with other difficulties including  food crises, floods, long distances, lack of transport and 
poor information (See Figure 2).   
 All these factors combined contribute to an extremely low effective demand for 
maternal health care in rural Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, it is estimated that 64% 
of the births in Sub-Saharan Africa lack the assistance of a skilled birth attendant 
(UNICEF, 2012a). 
 
Figure 2: Factors influencing market demand 
Source: (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2005) 
 
 
 Average income 
Rural Sub-Saharan women 
are very poor, with a low 
average income 
 
Size of the market 
Rural areas have smaller 
markets 
 
Availability of substitute 
goods 
Traditional birth attendants, 
home birth and availability of 
alternative medicine closer to 
women’s homes are cheaper 
alternatives 
 
Tastes and preferences 
Tradition; religion; cultural 
beliefs; habits customs; 
differences between African 
and western medicine; and 
gender differences  interfere 
with women’s ability to 
manage their own money and 
with women’s decision to 
seek care 
 
Special Influences 
Food crises, floods, distance, 
lack of information 
 
 
In parallel with these factors, demand is also influenced by the price of the 
service. To understand the effects of user fees we can establish a parallel with 
Negative effect 
on demand 
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microeconomics theory and analyse the effects on demand of a price increase. The 
introduction of a user fee can be looked at in the same way as an increase in the price 
of a given service.  
The relation between a market price and the demanded quantity of a given 
good has a particular characteristic, when everything else is held constant (namely the 
factors cited above), an increase in price causes consumers to lower their consumption 
– this is known as the “law of downward-sloping demand” (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 
2005). 
 As user fees represent an extra price for the user, it is fair to state that given 
the nature of user fees, they tend to decrease consumption. In this sense user fees 
negatively affect consumers’ behaviour.  
However, different consumers react differently to a price increase, ie, have 
different price elasticities. Price elasticity is thus the measure of the real impact of a 
price on the market. More exactly, “price elasticity of maternal healthcare” describes 
how much the quantity of maternal healthcare demanded may change with the 
introduction of user fees.  
The more demand is sensitive to price, the more it is elastic. Therefore, for a 
price elastic woman (a woman who responds to price), the higher the price increase 
caused by the introduction of a user fee, the greater the decrease in the quantity of 
maternal health sought by her.  On the contrary, the more “price inelastic” a woman is, 
the less she reacts to price increases, and the smaller is the impact of the fee on the 
demand quantity. For example, a women with a low purchasing power is more price 
elastic, thus in face of a price increase in maternal care, she will make more reductions 
to the quantity of maternal care purchased than a woman with a higher purchasing 
power.  
Different services of reproductive health can also have different types of 
elasticity.  For instance, in a situation where a women is more in need of 
technical/institutional assistance (such as complications during a delivery) her demand 
for assistance will be less price sensitive - more inelastic - than in a situation where her 
need for technical/institutional assistance is perceived as lower (such as during a 
normal delivery, family planning or pregnancy monitoring) and she will demand care at 
any price. Another example is, since as women often value more the health of their 
babies than their personal health, services that directly improve babies’ health may 
tend to be more price’ inelastic than services which do not directly affect their babies.   
Thus, women’s elasticity regarding maternal healthcare plays a very important 
role in determining the level of utilization of these services and their reaction to an 
increase in price. In this sense, elasticity is capable of influencing the amount of health 
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care demanded and the total revenue accumulation (proportion of price times the 
transacted quantity). This happens because if the demand for maternal healthcare is 
very elastic, a small percentage change in price (introduced by a user fee) may cause 
a great percentage decrease of maternal care demanded, and lead to a decrease in 
total revenue (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2005). In this case, from the supplier’s 
perspective, the additional revenue collected from the user fee does not compensate 
the loss in demand. 
 
3. How user fees affect supplier behaviour  
 
If we analyse the behaviour of producers upon the introduction of a user fee, we 
see that the relation between a market price and the supplied quantity of a given good 
has the opposite characteristic of demand, since it is an upward-sloping curve, when 
the price of a commodity is raised (and other things are kept constant like total amount 
suppliers receive, how they are paid, etc.) sellers tend to offer more of the commodity 
(Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2005). Therefore, user fees may have the effect of increasing 
the supplier’s will to provide more health care. 
The major factor influencing supply elasticity is production capacity. When all 
inputs can be readily found at going market prices and it is easy to adjust production, 
supply tends to be very elastic. When this does not happen, the response of suppliers 
to a change in price tends to be very sharp or inelastic. These are the main factors 
influencing suppliers’ response to price:  
1) Costs of production: when costs are higher than the market price it might turn 
out to be impossible for the supplier to sustain the production, or, at least to 
sustain the production at the same quality  
 Prices of inputs: the prices of labour, energy, machinery and other 
input commodities have a strong effect on production costs   
 Technological advances: technological advances may lower the 
amount of input needed to produce a same given good  
2) Prices of related goods: If the price of one production substitute increases, the 
supply of another substitute will increase 
3) Government Policy: health considerations, taxes and input-wages can 
significantly determine prices.  
4) Special influences: pharmacy industry and withdrawal of health 
personal from rural areas will affect market structure and its price. (Samuelson 
& Nordhaus, 2005).  
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4. How user fees appeared in the African context? 
  
The financial mechanism of user fees was developed in the West back in the 
70’s with the fundamental goal of regulating excesses of demand, but it is important to 
understand when and why they were introduced in Africa.  
Thirty years ago slow economic growth and record budget deficits forced reductions in 
public spending, particularly affecting the economies of Low and Middle Income 
Countries who had to deal with the structural adjustment policies recommended by 
donors (Akin J, Birdsall N, & Ferranti D, 1987; Ruger J, 2005; Yates R, 2009).  
To come up with a solution for the scarcity of Sub-Saharan health care funds, 
The Work Bank suggested alternative approaches. User fees were accepted as an 
opportunity for financing the health and social sectors in Low and Middle Income 
Countries  in the 80s (Gilson L, Russell S, & Buse K, 1995; Ridde V & F., 2010; Yisa 
IO, Awalade V, & Akinola., 2004). The introduction of user fees as a possible solution 
for financing health care in Africa was proposed (along with the decentralization of 
federal government, encouragement of business enterprises, promotion of 
nongovernment involvement and establishment of health insurance)  in the study of 
1987, Financing Health Services in Low and Middle Income Countries : An Agenda for 
Reform, and in the bank’s seminal World Development Report, 1993: Investing in 
Health (Akin J et al., 1987; The World Bank, 1993). This suggestion led to the 
accusation of  creating a climate of high levels of lending, advocating disability-adjusted 
life years as a health measure, disregard for the environment and indigenous 
populations, prevalence of economic outcome measures, insufficient evaluation of 
projects, lack of sustainability of projects, poor evidence base for policies, promotion of 
privatization, and compelling  countries to adopt structural adjustment for their 
economies (Ruger J, 2005). Many health professionals and representatives of non-
governmental organisations accused The World Bank of introducing the concept of 
user charges. Andrew Creese, a health economist at the World Health Organisation, 
also stated that «Increases in maternal mortality and in the incidence of communicable 
diseases have been attributed to such policies [user charges]»(Creese A, 1997: 203). 
On the other hand, According to Kamran Abbasi, Alex Preker, a principal economist at 
the bank and co-author of its 1997 strategy for the health, nutrition, and population 
sector, believes that the bank’s policy was misinterpreted and argues that «user 
charges are part of a panoply of instruments available to countries for resource 
mobilisation» and that «The bank doesn’t have a particular policy on whether user 
charges should or shouldn’t be used» (Abbasi K, 1999: 1005). Misinterpreted or not, 
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the fact is that today user fees are a recognized way of financing health systems in 
many Sub-Saharan countries with many implications.  
 According to Gilson (1997) there were two main vehicles for implementation of 
user fees in Africa (Gilson, 1997). One principal vehicle is the Bamako Initiative the 
other one is what she calls the “Standard model”. The Bamako Initiative (BI) was 
promoted by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO), adopted by African health ministers in 1987 and it is mostly used 
in francophone countries;(Gilson L et al., 2000; IDS, 2012). It appealed to the need for 
«community and individual self-reliance and participation in planning, organisation, 
operation and control of primary healthcare, making fullest use of local, national and 
other available resources» (IDS, 2012). The Bamako Initiative advocated that revenue 
should be raised and controlled at a primary level and that funds (user fee or equality 
payment for local taxes) should be locally managed by the community (Gilson L, 1997; 
IDS, 2012). It also stipulated that fees collected from patients should not replace 
existing health budgets. Critics argue that equity was only a minor goal in BI schemes, 
and that no country adopted significant programmes as developing community 
management and community participation (Gilson L, 1997; Gilson L et al., 2000).  
Instead of promoting the introduction of fees for curative hospital services, the 
“Standard Model”, is based on the concept that user fees should be a nationwide 
mechanism controlled at a regional or district level, thus, having the potential positive 
effect on the referral systems; on facilities’ reallocation of resources; on the quality and 
coverage of primary care; and on the protection of poor people (Gilson 1997).  
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5. Strengths and Weaknesses of user fees  
5.1. Strengths  
«User fees are seen as a practical solution in countries where 
it is difficult to ensure limited public funds reach peripheral facilities in a 
sufficient and timely manner.» (Grepin K, 2009: 4) 
 
a) Revenue and quality 
 
One of the major flags of user fees in Africa has been its potential to raise 
additional revenue (Akin J et al., 1987; Dao H, Waters H, & Le Q, 2008; Gilson L, 1997; 
Grepin K, 2009; IDS, 2012; James C et al., 2006; Mwabu G, 1990; The World Bank, 
1993).  Budgetary constraints limit resources in hospitals, thus, supporters of user fees 
in Low and Middle Income Countries argue that revenue from fees not only helps solve 
a practical problem of limited public resources, relieving government’s financial burden, 
as they reduce the dependence on external aid, and lead to improvement in the quality 
of services and patients’ satisfaction (Akashi H, Yamada T, Huot E, Kanal K, & 
Sugimoto T, 2004; Borghi et al., 2006; Gilson L, 1997; Gilson L et al., 1995; Grepin K, 
2009; James C et al., 2006; Nanda P, 2002; Yisa IO et al., 2004). Authors who defend  
user fees maintain that under the right circumstances user fees revenue may lead to 
quality improvements, increasing demand for healthcare and the welfare of the poor 
(Britán R & Giedion U, 2002) (See Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Adoption of user fees and quality improvements 
Source: (Britán R & Giedion U, 2002) 
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It is said that user fees can be used to improve staff salaries, to increase 
employees’ motivation and performance, to purchase drugs (securing a continuous 
stock of medicines) and to upkeep buildings and equipment (Grepin K, 2009; IDS, 
2012). What is more, more resources collected in a decentralized way, unlike a 
centralized heavy structure, may have positive effects by contributing to additional 
quality improvements (IDS, 2012).   
In the work “User Charges in health care: a review of the concept goals 
and implications to national health systems”, Yisa (2004) also describes how 
despite the small contribution to national health budgets, user fees are an 
important source of revenue at the level of individual facilities (Yisa IO et al., 
2004). 
Studies from Vietnam stress the importance of user fees as a source of 
revenue, given the shortage of the fiscal budget for health care due to the collapse of 
the cooperative system (Dao H et al., 2008; Sepehri A, Chernomas  H, & Akram-Lodhi 
H, 2005). According to Sepehri (2005) revenues from user charges accounted for 30% 
of public hospital revenue, and replaced a salary system based upon a centrally 
determined global budget with provision-based bonus systems, which had positive 
effects on regulation.  
A further study, from Cambodia, describes how the revenue from user fees was 
used to begin a cycle of financial sustainability and to improve the quality of hospital 
services, increasing  the satisfaction rate for user-fee system up to 92.7%, and 
doubling the number of outpatients (Akashi H et al., 2004). While hospital revenue 
increased, the revenue generated was used to compensate low government salaries, 
and to expand hospital services.  
 
b) Demand and Cost Reduction 
It terms of utilization, the major argument is that co-payments reduce frivolous 
demand for care, promoting cost consciousness among patients, i.e. consumer moral 
hazard, and have the potential to reduce supply moral hazard, limiting the prescription 
of drugs, unnecessary investigation and other out-of-pocket costs that result from the 
perspective of free care (Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005; Haddad S & Fournier P, 1995; IDS, 
2012; Yisa IO et al., 2004).  
 
c) Equity  
The revenue from urban services could be used to cross-subsidise 
disadvantaged people in rural areas promoting decentralization and price coordination 
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among different facilities (Gilson L et al., 1995; James C et al., 2006; Yisa IO et al., 
2004). At the same time fees could be applied to the non-poor using target 
mechanisms favouring low income populations in a cost effective way, one being the 
use of exemptions (Akashi H et al., 2004; Gilson L, 1995 1997; Gilson L & McIntyre D, 
2005; IDS, 2012; Nanda P, 2002). 
The study from Cambodia cited above is an example of how user-fee revenue 
offered payment exemption to low-income users promoting equality, since demand for 
the services increased instead of decreasing (Akashi H et al., 2004). Another study 
from Ghana also reports a free exemptions policy, that addressed the health needs of 
the poor in a cost effective way (Gilson L, 1995 ). 
In a case study of Tanzania it is maintained that «Because of inadequate 
supplies of drugs and of food at hospitals many patients had to incur substantial costs 
to use the ‘free’ services in addition to travel costs. It is therefore concluded that 
modest charges, with attempts to exempt the poor, would be less inequitable than the 
existing situation, if the revenue could be used to ensure that supplies were always 
adequate at government health services.» (Smith B & Rawal P, 1992: 329)  
 
d) Referral  
Problems with referrals and coordination of health care are acute in most Low 
and Middle Income Countries, where patients go directly to the emergency room, 
receive a diagnosis and/or treatment and return home without a transfer of information 
between the hospital and their local clinic; and where, sometimes, practitioners working 
in  isolation avoid referring patients due to the fear of losing the client (Mwabu G, 1990; 
The World Bank and GAVI Allience, 2010).  
By setting higher prices for higher levels of care, user fees are said to stimulate 
the prioritization of low level facilities, thus rationalizing patient’s use of referral care 
(Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005; IDS, 2012; Mwabu G, 1990; Yisa IO et al., 2004).  
«Hospital fees would induce patients to seek treatment in hospitals 
when cheaper treatment in lower level, non-paying facilities is 
unavailable or has proved to be ineffective.  Unless hospital care is 
made substantially more expensive than primary care, patients would 
always want to use it (even for minor illnesses) because it is of higher 
quality.  The consequence of treatment seeking behaviour induced by 
under-pricing of hospital services is overcrowding of hospitals by 
patients who can be successfully treated in lower level facilities.  
Overcrowding of health facilities is not conducive to efficiency and 
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effectiveness in service delivery.  Charging of modest user fees in 
hospitals, while maintaining free services in primary health 
facilities, would ease patients' congestion in referral facilities.  
Such a fee structure is consistent with the principle of equity in health 
service delivery, since patients who cannot afford to pay hospital 
fees can obtain treatment from free facilities.  Also, patients who 
cannot be cured by treatment provided in non-paying facilities can be 
referred for free or subsidized follow-up care in hospitals.  However, 
patients would find free facilities attractive only if the services provided 
there are of good quality.  Efforts should therefore be made to use 
the fiscal resources released by user fees to improve quality of 
service in primary health facilities, and to finance preventive 
services.  Even though such resources in many countries would be 
small proportions of total budgets of ministries of health, they are likely 
to be substantial in relation to expenditures on primary health services. » 
(Mwabu G, 1990: 5) 
 
  
e) Unofficial Payments  
Another potential strength of user fees is that official fees are expected to have 
a beneficial effect on access, leading to a reduction in unofficial fees (Haddad S & 
Fournier P, 1995; IDS, 2012; Khan S, 2005; Yisa IO et al., 2004). This situation is 
reported in three studies citing the Cambodia experience. According to Griffiths (2003), 
«Despite significantly increased official user fees constituting 16% of recurrent costs, 
the utilization of services equally increased. Patients thought the fees were reasonable 
because they were still lower than the fees demanded if government health workers 
charged informally» (Soeters R & Griffiths F, 2003: 74). Also James (2006) states that 
fees replaced irregular and often high informal fees in Cambodia and Bekedam (2004), 
explains how the formalizing  unofficial payments within a comprehensive resource 
management system has the potential to increase utilization by protecting patients from 
the unpredictability of informal fees, in addition to reducing out-of-pocket expenditure 
(Barber S, Bonnet F, & Bekedam  H, 2004; James C, 2006).  
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f) Efficiency  
And thus one of the major pillars of the user fees rational is their potential to 
promote efficiency. Since user fees are said to increase revenue, quality, satisfaction 
and income redistribution, producing appropriate allocation incentives, while reducing 
excessive costs produced by moral hazard, and the use of hospital services with 
negligible benefits, they generate maximum gains at minimal costs. (Akin J et al., 1987; 
Gilson L, 1997; Gilson L et al., 1995; Grepin K, 2009; Haddad S & Fournier P, 1995; 
James C et al., 2006; Mwabu G, 1990; The World Bank, 1993).   
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5.2. Weaknesses  
 
a) Revenue and Quality 
Many authors state that in most Low and Middle Income Countries where user 
fees were introduced, fee revenue contribute only to a small share of total revenue and 
are insufficient to address quantity and quality improvements (Bennett  S & Gilson L, 
2000; Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005; Gilson L, 1997; IDS, 2012; Mwabu G, 1990; Nanda P, 
2002; Yates R, 2009). A study form Zaire shows that «the regular supply of drugs and 
the improvement in the technical quality of the services, technical qualification of the 
staff, allocation of microscopes, and renovation of the infrastructures was not enough 
to compensate for the additional financial barriers created by the increased cost of 
services» (Haddad S & Fournier P, 1995: 743). 
Another study, from Tanzania also describes limited positive evidence  that  
user  fees  in  this country have overall achieved their original objectives of 
sustainability, drug availability, and quality of care (Laterveer L, Munga M, & Schwerzel 
P, 2004). «Revenues raised from user fees at the hospital level have been lower than 
what has been projected», says Leontien Laterveer (2004) in the study “Do we retain 
the user fee or do we set the user f(r)ee?” (Laterveer L et al., 2004: v). 
Why does this happen? For many authors user charges don’t make a significant 
contribution to raising revenue because fees charged are very low (Bennett  S & Gilson 
L, 2000; Gilson L, 1997; Mwabu G, 1990). User fees generate on average 5% of 
recurrent health expenditure (Gilson L, 1997). Revenue levels tend to be this low 
because they are proportional to low household income levels, limiting the scope to 
improve quality and quantity outcomes (Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Gilson L, 1997) 
and because there is little effort at the facility level to collect the fees charged (Mwabu 
G, 1990) 
Also, many low and middle income settings do not observe improvements in 
revenue raised and quality because of poor design of fee systems; poor capacity of 
local financial management and fee system implementation; and weak supporting 
systems and other contextual constraints (Gilson L, 1997). What is more, the lack of 
financial management systems; of information; of knowledge to target the real poor, of 
supervision; of policy monitoring; high bureaucracy and hierarchy conduct to failures in 
retaining revenue. Furthemore, she adds «weak accounting and management skills 
undermine implementation» and «the nature of quality improvements cannot be 
addressed simply by revenue generation» (Gilson L, 1997: 277). 
28 
 
For The Coalition for Health and Education Rights fees often lower quality 
because they «are usually designed to shift or reduce costs, rather than to improve 
outcomes at a given unit cost» (The Coalition For Health and Education Rights, 2002: 
8)  
In addition, two studies report that some facilities do not spend all fee resources 
in the health sector (Laterveer L et al., 2004; Waddington C & Enyimayew K, 2006). 
And finally, the world bank states: «the introduction of user fees at levels that do 
not discourage the poor is likely to be more useful for improving technical efficiency 
than for raising substantial revenues on a nationwide basis» (The World Bank, 1993) 
 
b) Cost Recovery 
One other factor limiting the potential of user fee revenue is the burden of 
administrative costs, which include human resources, issuing receipts, accounting, 
managing money, banking, etc. Administrative costs do not permit the use of total 
collected revenue, which tends to be low, reducing cost recovery levels (Gilson L, 
1997; Kutzin J & Creese A, 1995; The World Bank and GAVI Allience, 2010). The cost 
recovery potential of user fees is particularly restricted when revenue from user fees is 
not retained at the point of collection (Normand C & S., 2008) and most of the studies 
relate to small scale projects and do not take into account the high management costs 
associated with user fee systems.(Yates R, 2006 )  
 
c) Corruption 
Several studies describe how under-resourced hospitals and poorly paid staff 
create space for corrupt practices, retaining revenue at the source and preventing 
quality improvements (Afsana K, 2004; Ensor T & San P, 1996; Gilson L, 1997; IDS, 
2012; McPake B et al., 1999). Waddington (2006) found while analysing the impact of 
user charges in the Volta region of Ghana, that «fee revenue can be dangerously 
attractive, particularly if it is administratively more accessible than general government 
allocations»  (Waddington C & Enyimayew K, 2006: 287). While exploring informal 
economic activities of public health workers in Uganda, McPake and colleagues also 
state that «where formal charges are collected, high levels of leakage occur both at the 
point of collection and at higher levels of the system» (McPake B et al., 1999: 849). 
The article “User fees in government health units in Uganda” also concludes:« 
implementation of cost sharing has been problematic largely because of unclear 
policies and corruption in the health units» (Konde-Lule J & Okello D, 1998: iv). 
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d) Demand 
A study regarding user charges and quality of health services in Morocco 
demonstrates that an increase of more than 10% of out-of-pocket costs has a 
detrimental influence on the utilization rate, regardless of quality improvements 
(Hotchkiss D, Krasovec K, El-Idrissi D, Eckert E, & Karim A, 2003).  
Another study, from Tanzania, also found that «fees have negatively impacted 
the use of health care by the rural poor population» (Laterveer L et al., 2004: vi). In his 
literature review James CD (2006) declares that «since 2000 studies show that fees 
reduce usage»  and also Sara Bennett’s review (2000) describes that «all cases and 
where fees were increased or introduced registered a decrease in service» (Bennett  S 
& Gilson L, 2000: 9; James C et al., 2006: 137). Most of the articles analysed conclude 
that user fees reduce services utilization (Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Bennett S & 
Gilson L, 2001 ; Ching P, 1995; Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005; Haddad S & Fournier P, 
1995; Hotchkiss D et al., 2003; IDS, 2012; James C et al., 2006; Moses S et al., 1992; 
Yates R, 2009).  
 
 Figure 4: Adoption of user fees and minimal quality improvements 
Source: (Britán R & Giedion U, 2002) 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 4 we can see the effect of a quality improvement. While this may 
increase utilization (as described in Section X above) the increase in price caused by 
the introduction of the user fee may reduce utilization. This is shown in the diagram by 
Decrease in quantity demanded 
when price and quality are higher 
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the red dot, which signals the level of consumption when quality improvements are 
small or do not impact consumers choice. 
 
e) Equity 
Equity is the most challenging weakness of user fees. Economic theory predicts 
that «if the willingness to pay or if the financial liquidity of wealthier patients exceeds 
that of lower income patients and if the government charges the average willingness to 
pay for health services, mainly the wealthy will benefit and the poor may be unable to 
access health services»(Grepin K, 2009: 4). 
All the studies analysed refer to the potential of user fees to harm poor people 
and make a clear statement on how fees promote income and geographic inequalities 
(Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Dao H et al., 2008; Doorslaer E et al., 2006; Ensor T & 
San P, 1996; Falkingham J, 2004; Gilson L, 1997; Gilson L & McIntyre D, 2005; 
Hotchkiss D et al., 2003; James C et al., 2006; Laterveer L et al., 2004; Russel S, 
1996; Sepehri A et al., 2005; Somkotra T & Lagrada L, 2008; Yates R, 2009). Price 
plays a significant role in the demand for health care of the poor, and the poor are very 
price sensitive responding to price increases proportionally more than rich people 
(Russel S, 1996). Also, since there are more poor people in rural Africa, these areas 
will be more impoverished than urban areas, thus user fees create geographic 
disparities (Gilson L, 1997). In Africa poverty is predominantly rural, with more than 70 
(per cent) of the continent’s poor people living in rural areas. Sub-Saharan Africa has 
more than 218 million people living in extreme poverty and in Eastern and Southern 
Africa most of the region’s 130 million poor people live in rural areas (International 
Fund for Agricultural Development IFAD, 2012).  
Rural households are less able to generate revenue from existing resources, 
and borrow almost double that of urban households (Khan S, 2005). Also for rural 
households, often reliant on subsistence farming, it is often very difficult to access cash 
at the time of need due to temporal or seasonal cash availability (Soucat A et al., 
1997). This was reportedly a major constraint to paying for health care for between 40 
and 50% of households in West Africa (Soucat A et al., 1997). For these people, fees 
are not affordable and the imposition of charges leads to one of three roads: either they 
restrain their use of health services, and «the more serious the illness the less choice 
but to pay for treatment and make sacrifices elsewhere»; either they avoid payment or 
they become more impoverished due to effects of high catastrophic health expenditure 
(Russel S, 1996: 225; Somkotra T & Lagrada L, 2008; Yates R, 2009). Faced with 
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health crises and without money to pay for care, households may delay, decrease or 
eventually stop health care consumption. This is done by reducing their attendance 
rate and length of stay, by cutting the level of treatment, by not completing treatment 
regime, shifting demand to other providers, treating only priority individuals or not 
seeking treatment at all (Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005; Russel S, 1996).  
Poor villagers who, despite difficulties mobilizing resources to pay for care, still 
try to protect consumption of necessary health, are forced to adopt defensive, and 
sometimes perverse, strategies such as: making claims on kin or on other households; 
withdrawal of a child from school or reduction food consumption;  borrowing cash from 
money lenders or a bank; forgoing consumption of other essential commodities like 
food; foregoing investments in other essential areas;  selling or pledging stores and 
assets (sell belongings, sell livestock, use savings, etc.); begging or asking for charity; 
or finding ways to delay payment (Falkingham J, 2004; Russel S, 1996; Smith B & 
Rawal P, 1992).  Furthermore, poor villagers often have no assets or savings; no one 
wants to lend them money and when someone does, they ask for high interest rates; 
what is more, they are susceptible to the unpredictable and seasonal nature of income; 
they usually have a large number of dependents; and are more vulnerable to illness 
(Afsana K, 2004; Gilson L, 1997; Russel S, 1996; The Coalition For Health and 
Education Rights, 2002 ).  
All coping strategies have high opportunity costs and Russel (1996) raised 
several questions in this regard: how can all households rely on support networks 
under strain to borrow money? What is the impact of debt repayments? What are the 
nutritional consequences of foregoing essential food consumption? What are the 
immediate consequences for their illness? How does their choice not to invest  in 
preventive health, education, business, and farming inputs affect future earning 
capacity, health endangered and future crop yields? Does the sale of productive assets 
and stores cause loss of livelihood and future vulnerability? What is the impact of a 
delay, reduction or break in treatment? Are there more complications, greater costs in 
the long run, ineffective treatment, increases in preventable mortality and morbidity? 
Health service charges on households’ limited budgets impact their expenditure 
priorities, their consumption and expenditure patterns (Russel S, 1996).  
The following table (Table 4), adapted from the work of (Russel S, 1996) Russel 
(1996), provides taxonomy for consumers’ behaviours, strategies, responses and 
opportunity costs when faced with health care costs beyond routine budgets. Russel 
suggests that, in order to protect consumption against necessary health care, some of 
the strategies used include making claims, begging, forego other consumption, borrow 
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cash, avoid payment, reduce attendance or not seeking treatment at all. Some of the 
consequences of this may include, higher resistance to drugs, reductions in length of 
stay more complications, nutritional deficiencies, increases in preventable morbidity 
and mortality, social stigma, impoverishment and/or greater vulnerability in future.  
 
 
Table 4: No cash to pay for care: a typology of strategies, responses and coping 
strategies 
 
Consumption 
behaviour 
Strategy Response Opportunity costs in short and longer 
term 
Protect 
consumption 
of necessary 
health care 
Continue  to  
spend  cash on  
health  care 
Make  claims other households Support networks under strain - can they 
be relied upon? 
Begging or charity Social stigma? 
Delay payment Compromising the future? 
Forego consumption of  essential 
commodities 
Nutritional deficiencies? More prone to 
illness? 
Forego investment in other essential 
areas 
Future health endangered? Future 
earning capacity reduced? Future crop 
yields reduced? 
Sell cash crops  Loss of livelihood?  Impoverishment? 
Borrow cash from money lender or 
bank 
Debt repayments-impact of repayments 
on future consumption and investment? 
Impoverishment? 
Use or sell stores and assets Fewer buffers and greater vulnerability in 
future? 
Receive  health  
care  without 
spending  cash 
Avoid payment Social stigma? 
Seek exemption 
Modify health 
care 
consumption 
Delay  or  
reduce  
consumption 
Delay consumption More complications? Greater cost in long 
run? Risky reductions in length of stay? 
Greater resistance to drugs? Ineffective 
treatment regime? 
Reduce attendance rate, length of 
stay 
Cut level of treatment 
Do not complete treatment regime 
Diversify  
consumption 
or  reduce  
consumers 
Shift demand to other providers Whose care is sacrificed? What 
implications? Only treat priority individuals 
Stop  
consumption 
Do not seek treatment Increases in preventable morbidity and 
mortality? 
Source: (Russel S, 1996) 
 
Another article concerning out-of-pocket payments in Tajikistan, notes official 
payments deter people from seeking medical assistance and from receiving the most 
appropriate treatment (Falkingham J, 2004). Afsana (2004) also describes how cost 
increases increase the fear of seeking hospital care in Bangladesh. Gilson (2005) in his 
fundamental study of fee removal in Africa elucidates how charges can encourage 
inappropriate self-treatment and use of partial drug doses or may act as a barrier to 
early use, or perhaps any use, of health facilities. Another study, about formal and 
informal user fees in Egypt, India, Kenya, Peru, and Vietnam describes how in view of 
limited resources women sometimes cut down or did not want to take the prescribed 
medicines (Sharma S et al., 2005). Also the work of Moses (1992) explains how the 
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introduction of user fees increased the number of untreated patients in the population 
with potential long-term complications in Kenya (Moses S et al., 1992).  
 
f) Exemptions  
User fee waivers or exemptions are the main mechanisms adapted for 
protecting the poor from the financial burden of health care tariffs (Leighton C, 1995), 
however it does not seem to work. Apparently, little attention has been paid to their 
design and implementation; they cause an adverse effect on quality; generate low 
protection to the poor; are not functional in practice, generally misused, rare and 
inefficient (Bennett S & Gilson L, 2001 ; Borghi J, 2008; Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005; 
Gilson L, 1997; Grepin K, 2009; Ridde V & F., 2010; Sharma S et al., 2005). For Ensor 
& Ronoh (2005), «much of the argument against user charges rests on the observation 
that user charges are rarely implemented in a way that ensures revenue is retained by 
local facilities and exempts those not able to pay» (Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005: 51). To 
Bitrán (2002) «The problem with user fees is that the lack of provisions to confer partial 
or full waivers to the poor often results in inequity in access to medical care» (Britán R 
& Giedion U, 2002: iv). Furthermore, policies that exempt certain patients (e.g. those 
who are indigent) from paying are very difficult to achieve unless the exemption criteria 
are clear and applied correctly (Richard F et al., 2011). 
In  Burkina  Faso, those who were eligible to receive such protection were often 
prevented from accessing  it  due  to  administrative  and  other  practical  difficulties  
associated with the policy’s implementation (Storeng K et al., 2008). Exemptions 
represent additional administration costs. For instance in Zimbabwe, the administration 
of health user fees cost 400% more for each dollar raised than through the tax system 
(The Coalition For Health and Education Rights, 2002 ).  
Studies also refer to how those with influence benefit over those in real need 
(Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005; Gilson L, 1997). In Vietnam there is evidence that 
exemptions are repeatedly  distributed to fellow workers and administrators rather than 
among the poor (Ensor T & San P, 1996). Leighton (1995) describes how the corrupt 
health staff, the poor working of administrative mechanisms, and difficulties in 
identifying the poor affect efficacy of user fees (Leighton C, 1995) lack of awareness 
among the majority of potential beneficiaries; lack of publicity; unwillingness of health 
staff to inform their clients are another problems limiting exemption mechanism says 
Sharma (2005) (Sharma S et al., 2005).  
Additionally, Gilson (2005) points how informational, administrative, resource 
and social and  political constraints undermine the development of effective targeting 
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mechanisms (Gilson L & McIntyre D, 2005). Reimbursement delays, recapitalization of 
the IHCs, administrative documents are also barriers identified in a study in Niger 
(Ridde V, Diarra A, & Moha M, 2011).  
Finally, problems with spending and sustaining the funding, budgeting and 
management, are also reasons why exemptions do not attain their potential in Ghana 
(Witter S, Kojo Arhinfulb D, Kusic A, & Zakariah-Akotod S, 2007). The study from 
Rawal (1992) shows too how inadequate supplies of drugs and food at hospitals lead 
patients to incur substantial costs using the “free” services. Despite exemptions many 
households have to pay informal fees and other costs are not alleviated (Sharma S et 
al., 2005). In addition, access to quality care and medicine free of charge does not 
ensure that people seek “proper” treatment, especially when elements like time, 
confidence and someone to mind the other children are lacking. Also Rawal (1992), 
Kowaleweski (2002), Nanda (2002), Allegria (2011), Pearson (2011) and Khan (2005), 
mention how travel costs, medicine, tests, food, tips and length of stay limit access to 
hospital despite the exemptions and waivers. 
Another dimension of exemptions is that they potentially contribute to social 
stigma (as no one likes to be labelled as poor) and the inferior quality of care that 
patients fear to receive once they are identified as unable to pay (Borghi J, 2008; Khan 
S, 2005). Evidence shows that because exemptions decrease revenue, they go hand-
in-hand with decreases in quality outcomes. 
 
g) Efficiency 
Given their high administrative costs, inefficient exemptions, the tendency to 
create inequities, and structural factors that limit the policy implementation, in general, 
user fees are not able to maximize revenue and quality health care, nor minimize the 
cost of providing health care (Gilson L, 1997; IDS, 2012; Nanda P, 2002; Yates R, 
2009). In fact, user fees may even worsen efficiency because they do not save 
unnecessary utilization, they generate inappropriate utilization, and encourage 
providers to provide more care than necessary by referring patients to their own 
channels of medication trading and over prescribing (Gilson L, 1997; IDS, 2012).  
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6. User fees in maternal health  
a) Low demand 
One of the biggest concerns regarding the practice of user charges in maternal 
health is how they impact demand, which is already inappropriately low (Ensor T & 
Ronoh J, 2005). Several studies demonstrate how maternal health is extremely 
sensitive to imposed user fees, which is reflected in outcome mortality. A study in 
Kenya mentions how the adjusted total mean monthly attendance by women during the 
user-charge period was reduced significantly to 65% (55-77) of the pre-user-charge 
level (Moses S et al., 1992). In another Kenyan study attendance at government fee-
charging health facilities for both outpatient and inpatient care was lower during the 
period when full fees were charged than during the same months of the previous year, 
when fees were not charged, and outpatient attendances rose again when the 
registration fees were lifted (Mbugua J, Bloom G, & Segall M, 1995). A Nigerian study 
shows also how  mothers could not afford to pay for prenatal care and delivery in the 
hospital and how the fees decreased the purchasing power of women and their 
utilization levels, increasing the perinatal mortality rate by 38.7%  (Mbugua J et al., 
1995).  
Evaluations of delivery care rates before and after the introduction of user fees 
documented in most cases a reduction in the number of facility-based deliveries 
(Mbugua J et al., 1995; Owa J, Osinaike A, & Makinde O, 1995; Taylor C, Sanders D, 
Bassett M, & Goings S, 1993). In Nigeria, deliveries fell by 46-50% following the 
introduction of fees in one hospital (1983-1988) (Owa et al. 1992; Owa et al. 1995). A  
12% reduction in maternity admissions was noted in Kenya (fees were withdrawn a  
year  after  their  introduction)  (Mbugua  &  Segall  1995),  and  in  Harare, Zimbabwe, 
deliveries in a health centre fell by 19% between 1981 and 1988 following  the  
introduction  of  fees  (Taylor  et  al.  1993).   
  
b) Vulnerability of rural poor pregnant women and high costs 
Pregnancy is a particular moment of vulnerability for poor rural women and the 
cost of childbirth is largely determined by the place of delivery and the type of delivery 
and extent of complications. From the analysed studies that relate to women’s health 
when user fees are charged, the excessive costs of maternal health care seem to play 
a major role in the low demand for services during pregnancy, partum and post-partum 
periods (Afsana K, 2004; Borghi et al., 2006; Khan S, 2005; Kowalewski M, Mujinja P, 
& A., 2002; Mohanty S & Srivastava A, 2012; Nahar S & Costello A, 1998; Pearson L, 
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Gandhi M, Admasu K, & E, 2011; Perkins M et al., 2009; Sharma S et al., 2005; 
Storeng K et al., 2008; Storeng K, Murray S, Akoum M, Ouattara F, & Filippi V, 2010).  
«It is very difficult to prepare for the costs of obstetric care because the outcome of 
pregnancy is difficult to foresee and because the costs of care vary widely between 
facilities, are not predictable and include a range of indirect costs» (Storeng K et al., 
2008)554.  
 
c) Emergency Obstetric Care 
«Delivery is the single most costly event during 
pregnancy» (Borghi et al., 2006) 1458. 
The economic burden of emergency obstetric care has contributed to severe 
and long-lasting consequences for women and their households and is not just 
focussed on the intrapartum period, as it may last for some time after the delivery, 
particularly in the cases of obstetric emergencies or near-miss events (Sophie Witter, 
2008; Storeng K et al., 2008).   
 According to Poletti (2004), who studies cost-recovery in health emergencies, 
«many people working in humanitarian relief have an instinctive resistance to the 
introduction of user fees in complex emergencies. It runs counter to the ethos and 
principles of humanitarianism, under which assistance should be rendered to people 
affected by conflict on the basis of need alone  (Poletti T, 2004). «To many, it seems 
absurd that people who are struggling to survive in difficult and unstable 
circumstances should have another financial burden placed on them. The 
potential for catastrophic health expenditure is self-evident in complex 
emergency settings, where people’s asset base is typically extremely vulnerable 
and their health needs are grossly elevated» (Poletti T, 2004). To this expert «cost-
sharing should not be introduced in complex emergency settings». 
d) Rural poor women  
Studies show that maternal health care is too expensive for rural households 
and produces geographical disparities (Afsana K, 2004; Khan S, 2005; Mohanty S & 
Srivastava A, 2012; Nahar S & Costello A, 1998). Rural women have more difficulty in 
paying than urban patients(Khan S, 2005), thus «increases in out-of-pocket costs for 
public facilities would be expected to have very little impact on women living in better-
off households, but would have a substantial and detrimental effect on the 
poor»(Hotchkiss D et al., 2003: 2) In a Bangladesh study half of patients (rural women) 
had to borrow money to pay for care, and one third of these families reports selling 
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jewellery, land or household items to moneylenders (Khan S, 2005). Another study 
from Bangladesh reports that twenty-one per cent of families were spending 51-100 % 
of monthly income and 27 % of families 2-8 times their monthly income for maternity 
care (Nahar S & Costello A, 1998). It also showed that 51 % of the families (and 74 % 
of those having a caesarean delivery) did not have enough money to pay; of these, 79 
% had to borrow from a money lender or relative (Nahar S & Costello A, 1998).  
 It is generally difficult for a women to mobilise resources for their own health 
care needs, and with  little cash and often lack of control over their own money, with 
limited options for seeking care, and living further away from health facilities many 
women are forced to make trade-offs in not seeking health care in order to purchase 
food or fuel, or they may seek traditional health care that does not address their needs 
appropriately (Borghi et al., 2006; Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005; Nanda P, 2002). 
«Collecting the required money was difficult for poor villagers, who usually had no 
assets or savings. No one wanted to loan them money either. Some families borrowed 
money from moneylenders at very high interest rates, which tripled within six months. 
Some raised money by selling domestic birds, cattle or land or even a tin shed roof.» 
(Afsana K, 2004: 177).  
e) Complications  
The case is even more concerning when complications occur during delivery. 
When complications occur reproductive health can be even more costly and plunge a 
household into poverty or force it to rely on risky coping strategies (Ensor & Ronoh 
2005). «If mother or child suffers complications, costs can skyrocket» (Richard F, 
Witter S, & Brouwere V, 2010: 1845). According to data from the 2008 study from 
Borghi and Colleagues, the cost of normal deliveries in a hospital may range from a low 
of $3.86 in Tanzania to $47.28, while the  cost  of  complicated  deliveries  ranged  
from  $7.35  in  Tanzania to $355.20 in Bangladesh, with drug  costs    the  most  
significant  expenditure  item,  representing  on average  43%  of  the  total  treatment  
cost (See Tables 5 and 6 in appendix) (Borghi J, 2008). In data from 2006 complicated 
deliveries were calculated to cost households between three and ten times more than 
normal deliveries, and the cost of complicated deliveries is often catastrophic, defined 
as being in excess of 10% of yearly household income (Borghi et al., 2006). A study 
from this year states that predicted expenditure for a caesarean delivery is six times 
higher than for a normal delivery (Mohanty S & Srivastava A, 2012). In another recent 
study from Ethiopia we may see how out of pocket costs for caesarean section were 
catastrophic for Low and mid income households and how treatment of neonatal 
complications also created a big financial burden (Pearson L et al., 2011). 
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f) Exemptions, corruption and sustainability 
The experience of exemptions in maternal health among Sub-Saharan 
countries care varies across settings:  
The  existence  of  exemptions in Tanzania minimized the cost differential 
between normal and complicated deliveries and protected households from uncertainty 
in terms of resource requirements (Borghi J, 2008). Ghana introduced a delivery fee 
exemption policy in late 2003 which was apparently effective at increasing the 
proportion of births supervised by trained medical personnel and the proportion of 
births delivered in facilities, increasing the level of professionalization and 
institutionalization of deliveries (Grepin K, 2009). However evidence shows that it 
resulted in adverse effects on the quality of services delivered and became non-
functional after 2 years due to lack resources; problems with disbursing and sustaining 
the funding; problems with budgeting and management; and lack of political will to 
make this policy sustainable in the long run. (Grepin K, 2009; Witter S et al., 2007). 
Burkina Faso introduced a cost-sharing system shared between 4 parties: the 
households, the management committees of health centres, the local authorities, and 
the Ministry of Health. It provided all care for the mother and her newborn (transport, 
intervention, and post-delivery care) for emergency or life-threatening cases and one of 
the major challenges was providing emergency obstetric care at all times and 
guaranteeing the package of services promised for the fee throughout the year 
(Richard F et al., 2010). In the study by Sharma (2005), in Egypt, India, Kenya, Peru, 
and Vietnam, many problems occurred with the awareness of the waiver/exemption 
mechanisms with the women of the five countries. They simply did not know about the 
existence of exemptions, or what they could do to have access to the policy (Sharma S 
et al., 2005). In Niger, a 2011 study testifies how women experienced significant delays 
in the reimbursement of treatments provided free of charge in the health centres (Ridde 
V et al., 2011). Demand for informal fees and corruption of the exemption mechanism 
is also present in maternal care, obstructing the access of poor and badly informed 
women in rural Africa (Afsana K, 2004; Borghi et al., 2006; Sharma S et al., 2005).  
 
g) Quality and revenue  
User fees have also been introduced in the context of maternal health to address 
the issue of revenue/quality versus equality. According to a study on the role of user 
charges and structural attributes of quality on the use of maternal health services the 
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gains in quality among wealthier households from out-of-pocket costs of using public 
facilities were to be doubled. Yet, still according to the report, among poor women, the 
net effect of any strategy that involved increases of more than 10% in out-of-pocket 
costs,  would have a detrimental influence on utilization rates, regardless of quality 
improvements (Hotchkiss D et al., 2003). Another study from Uganda, shows that user 
fees are relatively high for MCH services; increased local revenue has failed to 
materialize because people are reluctant or unable to pay user fees, and revenue 
raised goes to the district level for reallocation elsewhere (Mwesigye F, 1999). 
According to this study, in reality local facilities still have little decision-making and 
implementation authority because their need for health care financing forces them to 
turn to international donors and vertical programs. In other words, the potential for 
improving quality due to revenue increases from user fees is limited, as user fees are a 
small portion of financing. 
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7.  Recommendations for user fees and implementation of exemption  
 
7.1. User Fees  
 
Direct recommendations to improve the implementation of user fees include the 
introduction of a by-pass fee in areas where the primary care network is adequate and 
referred patients are exempted at higher levels of the system; the imposition of 
substantial inpatient fees combined with good insurance and good exemptions; the 
imposition of affordable fee levels (per day fee + maximum levels); improvement of 
collection procedures; use of a simple fee structure linked to the treatment received; 
periodic readjustment of prices; association of fees with quality improvements which 
promote the utilization of the primary level ; use of revenue retained at the point of 
collection for quality improvements; creation of guidelines/procedures to promote 
revenue use for perceived quality improvements; coordination of price structures 
across health systems levels; development of management-oriented information 
systems which allow monitoring by providing data on e.g. revenue collected, revenue 
use patterns; development of skills and systems to enable decentralization of 
resources; and utilization of effective audit procedures to ensure accountability of local 
level; and creation of price advertises within health facilities (Gilson L, 1997)  
Indirect recommendations for user fee improvement include the improvement of 
consumers’ willingness and ability to pay ; development of a resource reallocation 
mechanism favouring relatively under-resourced geographical areas and more cost-
effective services; improvement of professional ethics to counterbalance health 
workers’ responsiveness to financial incentives; development of community 
management mechanisms at a primary level and promotion of community solidarity 
mechanism which can assist the poor and ensures accountability to community; 
implementation of an effective reward and discipline system for health staff, including 
training; development of effective management and clinical supervision and support for 
local level (district or community); maintenance of existing levels of government funding 
for the health system as a whole; development of complementary risk-sharing financing 
mechanisms; development of a supportive legal framework for fee/sustainability 
policies; development of institutional capacity within the  health system to provide 
support to local level decision makers; provision of adequate leadership and advocacy 
skills within the health sector to develop political support for appropriate design and 
policy; and promotion of wider institutional support (e.g. banking facilities; 
communication facilities) (Gilson L, 1997) (See Table 7).  
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Table 7: Recommendations for user fees 
Issues addressed User fees 
Source (Gilson L, 1997) 
Design 
Introduce a by-pass fee in areas where the primary care network is adequate 
and referred patients are exempted at higher levels of system 
Impose substantial inpatient fees combined with good insurance and good 
exemptions 
Impose substantial fees for ‘private wards’, selected only by those willing to 
pay 
Impose affordable fee levels (per day fee + maximum levels) 
Improve collection procedures 
Use a simple fee structure linked to the treatment received 
Periodic readjustment of prices 
Target the Poor/Equity  
Improve consumers’ willingness and ability to pay  
Develop a resource reallocation mechanism favouring relatively under-
resourced geographical areas and more cost-effective services 
Corruption 
Improve professional ethics to counterbalance health workers’ responsiveness 
to financial incentives 
Quality 
Associate fees with quality improvements which promote the utilization of the 
primary level  
Some revenue retained at the point of collection for use in quality 
improvements  
Guidelines/procedures to promote revenue use for perceived quality 
improvements 
Coordination among levels of the 
health system/ Referral  
Coordinate the price structure across health systems levels (e.g. use sliding 
fees according to level of system)  
Community 
Develop community management mechanisms at a primary level  
Promotion of community solidarity mechanisms which can assist the poor 
Promote a community management mechanism which ensure accountability 
to community 
Staff 
Implement an effective reward and discipline system for health staff, including 
training 
Drugs Develop an effective drug procurement and supply system 
Management 
Effective management and clinical supervision and support for local level 
(district or community) 
Management-oriented information systems which allow monitoring by 
providing data on e.g. revenue collected, revenue use patterns 
Develop skills and systems to enable decentralization of resources use, 
control and management within wider system to appropriate level 
Effective audit procedures to ensure accountability of local level 
Information/ Communication Ensure the price structure is advertised within health facilities 
Funding Maintain existing levels of government funding for health system as a whole 
Policy Making/ Policy Framework 
Develop complementary risk-sharing financing mechanisms 
Develop a supportive legal framework for fee/sustainability policies 
Other contextual support 
Develop institutional capacity within health system to provide support to local 
level decision makers  
Adequate leadership and advocacy skills within the health sector to develop 
political support for appropriate design and policy 
Promote wider institutional support (e.g banking facilities; communication 
facilities) 
 
 
7.2. Exemptions 
Recommendations for improving exemptions and waiver systems are: utilization 
of simple-to-apply exemption categories; the prevention of establishment of incentives 
not to exempt; limitation of the amount of revenue that can be retained locally from 
fees; identification of specific and different sources of funding for the exemptions; 
attribution of equal weight to the goal of exemption and to revenue generation in 
implementation guidance; elaboration of clear central guidelines on eligibility criteria so 
that they distinguish between the poor and the non-poor and so that they are 
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reasonably feasible to implement at local level; introduction of exemption mechanisms 
before introduction of charges; the avoidance of exemption capture by non-poor groups 
such as civil servants; encouragement of exemption screening to take place close to 
the household in the community; monitoring of  performance; and guarantee of 
exemption system is given high priority by politicians and bureaucrats alike (Bennett  S 
& Gilson L, 2000; Gilson L, 1997) (See Table 8). 
Table 8: Recommendations for Exemptions and Waiver 
Issues addressed Exemptions and Waiver  
Source (Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Gilson L, 1997) 
Design 
Use simple-to-apply exemption categories (e.g. focusing on 
characteristics of users, or including some simple procedures to 
identifying poorest) 
Avoid establishment of incentives not to exempt 
Limit the amount of revenue that can be retained locally from fees;  
Identify specific and different sources  of  funding  for  the  exemptions 
Give equal weight to the goal of exemption and to revenue generation in 
implementation guidance 
Exemption mechanisms should be in place before introducing charges 
Target the Poor/Equity  
Provide clear central guidelines on eligibility criteria so that they 
distinguish between the poor and the non-poor 
Corruption 
Avoid the capture of exemptions by non-poor groups such as civil 
servants 
Community 
Enable exemption mechanisms to be  adapted  in  response  to  local  
circumstances,  but  only  within  limits  set  by  clear central guidance.  
Provide clear central guidelines on eligibility criteria so that they are 
reasonably feasible to implement at the local level;  
Encourage  exemption  screening  to  take  place  close  to  the  
household  in  the community  or  local  health  care  facility  through  
mechanisms  that  involve  both community members and health workers 
and by individuals trained for the task. 
Recognise that allowing some degree of capture  by  more  wealthy  
groups,  particularly  within  local  communities,  may  build sustained 
support for the exemption mechanism. 
Management 
Monitor performance against guidelines: how many exemptions are 
given, to whom, by whom?  
Information/ 
Communication 
Communicate  the  exemptions  policy  to  health  workers  and  the  
general  population  
Policy Framework 
Ensure that the exemption system is given high priority by politicians and 
bureaucrats alike  
8. Abolition of user fees 
 
8.1. Strengths of user fee abolition  
At the launch of the “UK Department for International Development’s new health 
strategy”, in 2007 the Director-General of the World Health Organization, stated the following:   
«Global poverty is a devastating injustice. Health development is the most 
effective way to tackle this injustice. Good health can indeed become a 
pathway to a fairer world. (...) If you want to reduce poverty, it makes sense 
to help governments abolish user fees. » Dr Margaret Chan. (Chan M, 2007) 
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Targeted abolition of user fees in Africa started in early 2000, with the race to 
reach the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, starting with abolition of fees for 
treatment of specific diseases and for pregnant women and children under five 
(Richard F et al., 2011). The abolition of user fees is estimated to prevent around 233 
000 (between 153 000-305 000) deaths in 20 African Countries (James C et al., 2005) 
and is considered as an alternative to increase equality and efficiency in the health 
systems (Borghi et al., 2006; De Allegria M et al., 2011; James C et al., 2005; 
Laterveer L et al., 2004; Masiye F, Chitah B, & McIntyre D, 2010; Ridde V & F., 2010; 
Xu K et al., 2005).    
The removal of user fees increases health care demand, especially due to 
increases in services used by poor people (Borghi et al., 2006; The Coalition For 
Health and Education Rights, 2002 ). Valéry Ridde in her scoping review on the 
abolition of user fees in health care services in Africa (2010), where more than 20 
studies were selected and analysed, states that «all the studies report increases in the 
visits after abolition» and concludes the removal of user fee produces both increases in 
curative visits in primary care and hospital deliveries (Ridde V & F., 2010: 6). Mylene 
Lagarde reviewed the impact of user fees on health service utilization in low- and 
middle-income countries (2008), using five longitudinal data studies, and confirms an 
abrupt increase in the utilization of curative services immediately following fee removal 
(Lagarde M & Palmer N, 2008). 
South Africa: as a means to improve access to health services and build 
national unity, the ANC Government in South Africa, removed user fees in 1994 for  all  
children  under  six  and  pregnant  and  lactating  women.  The result was a  large  
increase  in  the  use  of  curative  services, with outpatient attendances increasing by 
77% (Yates R, 2006 ). «Fee removal for maternal health services has been effective in 
increasing the mean number of booked deliveries by 4·6% in South Africa. » (Borghi et 
al., 2006: 1459) 
Uganda: in Uganda user fee were scrapped in 2001 in all Government health 
facilities (with the exception of private wings in larger hospitals) and were followed by a 
huge flow in demand for free health services. Outpatient attendances increased by 
155% (an extra 14.9 million visits) in the two years following  the  abolition  of  user  
fees  at  Government  health  units, and  utilisation  of  rural health  centres  increased  
by  77% (Yates R, 2006 ). Among the poor, utilization of public facilities also increased 
substantially after the abolition of fees (Xu K et al., 2005).  
Zambia: In Zambia fees were removed for all public health services in rural 
areas on April 1st 2006, and on average, utilisation in public health facilities across all 
rural districts among the population aged five years or older increased by 55% over the 
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twelve months following the removal of user fees. Evidence shows that utilisation 
increases were greatest in the districts with the highest levels of poverty and material 
deprivation (Masiye F et al., 2010)  
Madagascar : Once   services   became   free,   there   was   a   significant   
increase   in   the consumption of services to the extent that “monthly visits post-crisis 
almost doubled compared to the previous year” (Fafchamps and Minten, p11) (Yates 
R, 2006 ). 
Rwanda: Immediately after co-payments were eliminated in February 2007, 
patient visits levelled at a rate triple the previous value (Dhillon R, Bonds M, Fraden M, 
Ndahiro D, & Ruxin J, 2012). 
Niger: In 2006, an NGO intervened to abolish user fees in two Nigerian health 
districts and 43 health districts for children under five years and pregnant women. 
«Abolition brought relief to poor families. People no longer hesitated to come: “Free 
services are a good thing, because not everyone has what they need to bring a sick 
child to the IHC [integrated health centres]” (IHC manager/Abalak). Healthcare 
workers noted that utilization increased in both districts, but also that children were 
brought earlier than before: “Now women don’t hesitate to come, since it's free” (IHC 
manager/Keita)» (Ridde V & Diarra A, 2009: 221)  
Apparently the abolition of user fees, making services affordable to all, reduces 
delay from seeking cash and protects against indebtedness from care seeking, 
generating revenue in a more equitable way and avoiding administration costs and 
other inconveniences of exemptions mechanism (Borghi et al., 2006). Furthermore, 
studies show that at the same time the abolition of user fee avoids stigmatization, 
reducing exclusion and self-exclusion among the poor and vulnerable, and can be 
considered as a pro-poor option contributing to gaining political support (Laterveer L et 
al., 2004; Meessen B, Van Damme W, Tashobya C, & Tibouti A, 2006). 
 
8.2. Weaknesses of user fee abolition  
a) Quality 
The effect on quality of the abolition of fees is not the same everywhere. Some 
studies show that there has been no deterioration  of indicators on perceived quality 
(Masiye F et al., 2010), while other works describe declines in the quality of services, 
due to decreases in health systems’ revenues (Ridde V & F., 2010; The Coalition For 
Health and Education Rights, 2002 ). The majority of studies regarding abolition of user 
fees report limited capacity of health structures to deal with additional demand, causing 
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health staff workload increase, low availability of drugs and lack of medical supplies 
following the abolition of user fees (Borghi et al., 2006; Meessen B et al., 2006; Ridde 
V & F., 2010; Yates R, 2006 ). Ridde (2010) writes:  
«All the countries experienced problems of drug availability. In South 
Africa the distribution received little planning effort (Walker and Gilson 
2004) and in Madagascar it was late and poorly organized (Fafchamps 
and Minten 2007). Those involved in the Ghanaian health system 
consider that increased funding for drugs at the start of the exercise 
helped improve the quality of services, but this situation did not last 
(Witter and Adjei 2007; Witter et al. 2007b). Uganda seems to have 
fared better. While stock shortages were more frequent in the year 
following abolition, the situation improved thereafter (Burnham et al. 
2004; Deininger and Mpuga 2004; Kajula et al. 2004; Nabyonga et al. 
2005; Nabyonga-Orem et al. 2008). In South Africa, higher numbers of 
visits meant lower quality: less time for each patient, lack of privacy 
(Walker and Gilson 2004). Ugandan studies draw contradictory 
conclusions, with some reporting deteriorating cleanliness of facilities 
(Burnham et al. 2004), long waiting times and unfriendly staff (Kajula et 
al. 2004), while others report no change in cleanliness or workers’ 
attitudes (Nabyonga et al. 2005; Nabyonga-Orem et al. 2008)» (Ridde V 
& F., 2010: 7). 
 
b) Lack of Revenue and need for funding 
Although the gains generated by  user fees (revenue that would have been lost 
due to illness) may balance the revenue losses (Deininger K & P, 2005)1, many studies 
illustrate, that the abolition of fees needs  to  be  combined  with  considerable  effort  to  
increase levels  of  funding (internally and externally) and with improvements in the 
allocation and disbursement of funds. This is necessary to avoid the risk of shortages 
of drugs and medical supplies because eliminating fees reduces the overall revenue, 
especially at the service delivery level where most fees are collected and retained 
(James C, 2006; Laterveer L et al., 2004; Ridde V & F., 2010; The Coalition For Health 
                                               
1 In Uganda the loss of revenues to the health system «was estimated to be US$3.4 million annually, and 
was compensated by economic gains generated through fees abolition— an estimated US$9 million 
annually in revenues that, without abolition, would have been lost due to illness»)» (Deininger K & P, 2005: 
85) 
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and Education Rights, 2002 ; Yates R, 2009).  2 This is even more compelling in the 
case of reproductive health: «The available evidence makes a strong case for removal 
of user fees and provision of universal coverage for pregnant women, especially for 
delivery care. To be successful, governments must also make the substantial 
commitment to replenish the income lost through the abolition of user fees.» (Borghi et 
al., 2006: 1463) 
 
c) Informal Charges 
One of the main constraints on removal of user fees is the risk of informal 
charges, like bribes and non-transparent payments (Borghi et al., 2006; Meessen B et 
al., 2006; The Coalition For Health and Education Rights, 2002 ).  
 
d) Other costs 
Findings indicate that the reduction of user fees alone is not sufficient to ensure 
that all women benefit from skilled attendance at birth. Distance constitutes a major 
barrier to access, accompanied by the costs of emergency and non-emergency 
transport and the costs of time (since illness prevents people from working and 
receiving income and there is no supplementary funding for the loss of revenue) 
(Borghi et al., 2006; De Allegria M et al., 2011; Masiye F et al., 2010; Nahar S & 
Costello A, 1998; Storeng K et al., 2008). These other costs remain significant barriers 
even after the reduction or removal of user fees.   
 
e) Implementation  
Abolition of fees is said to be  initiated too quickly, due to international pressure, 
as conditionality for accessing funds or loans (Richard F et al., 2011). «Abolition of user 
fees for deliveries and caesarean sections, though presented as a quick impact 
intervention, is actually a very complicated strategy to implement. Success is 
dependent on good prior estimates of financial and other resources needed, taking into 
account an increase in the patient load, a willingness to enforce the policy by frontline 
staff, and to ensure good implementation» (Richard F et al., 2011: 47). According to 
Ridde’s (2010) review there is a scarcity of data in the literature on the processes of 
abolishing user fees in Africa and their different effects (Ridde V & F., 2010). 
                                               
2
 Revenue from user fees can be a substantial proportion of health facility budgets (for example, 38% in 
Nepal,39 35% in Burkina Faso, 26% in Ghana, and 14% in Indonesia40)  government funding needs to 
increase  (Yates R, 2009)  
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f) Lack of information 
Lack of information about the abolition of fees is also a problem: «after more 
than two years, information in Abalak was unevenly received “They don’t know it's free. 
Where they are, radio doesn’t reach, or they don’t listen”» (Ridde V et al., 2011: 222). 
 
g) Referral 
Evidence shows that after abolition of fees the respect of households for the referral 
system may decline (Meessen B et al., 2006). 
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9. Recommendations on fee abolition  
 
The major recommendations for improving elimination of fees are: directing patients to 
the most efficient care provider; increasing funding to reduce the risk of an increase in 
informal charges, ensuring sufficient staff, to avoid the risk of shortages of drugs and 
medical supplies; and good prior estimates of financial and other resources needed 
(Borghi et al., 2006; Richard F et al., 2011) (See Table 8).  
 
Table 8: Recommendations for the abolition of user fees 
Issues 
Addressed 
Fee Removal  
Source 
(Borghi et al., 2006; Richard F et al., 2011) 
 
Design 
Directing patients to the most efficient care provider can help mitigate against such events /invest in 
staff salaries and drugs and medical supplies 
Corruption 
Increase funding to reduce the risk of an increase in informal charges/ need for lost resources to be 
replaced by additional government revenue 
 (If there is a widespread system of informal payments this will need to be addressed prior to 
introducing a social health insurance scheme) 
Staff 
Introduce appropriate financial incentives to ensuring sufficient staff  
 
Drugs 
Increase government funding to avoid the risk of shortages of drugs and medical supplies 
 
Management 
Introduce appropriate financial incentives to  
ensure infrastructural capacity to manage increased demand, 
 
Funding Increase government funding 
Policy 
Framework  
Good prior estimates of financial and other resources needed, taking into account an increase in the 
patient load, a willingness to enforce the policy by frontline staff, and to ensure good implementation  
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10. Other mechanisms of financing maternal health care 
  
«Most countries have at least three mechanisms for financing maternal health 
services. Usually, there is a principal financing mechanism, such as tax revenue, or 
social health insurance, combined with user charges (both formal and informal), 
together with supplementary community financing for specific services and components 
of the health system. In most low-income countries, the funding for maternal health 
care is shared between government (through tax revenue) and households» (Borghi et 
al., 2006: 2). User fees are just one among many options for financing health systems 
and there remains a lack of evidence on the best methods of targeting resources 
(Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005). This section discusses other mechanisms that are 
alternatives to user fees in financing health systems.  
 
I. Universal Coverage 
 
Universal coverage is a method of taxation and risk sharing which channels 
funds raised from general government taxation of the population, to public providers 
such as hospitals, health centres, and public health programs to pay for staff salaries, 
medicines and other consumables and then services are free or available at a low price 
at the point of contact for patients (Normand C & S., 2008).  
The purpose of universal coverage in the health sector is to correct market 
failures when a public good, merit good, or good/service producing externalities is at 
stake or when there is a need to improve universal access and equity, which is the 
case of maternal care  (Prata N, Greig F, Walsh J, & West A, 2004).Universal 
Coverage (UC) policy implementation is a valuable social protection and safety net 
strategy that contributes to the prevention of financial catastrophe and impoverishment 
due to out-of-pocket payments for health care. The UC policy in Thailand achieves one 
of the goals of improving the health system through equitable health care financing by 
reducing financial catastrophe and impoverishment due to out-of-pocket payments for 
health care(Somkotra T & Lagrada L, 2008). 
Challenges: unaffordability and difficulty for policy makers to raise sufficient 
funds to pay for the necessary services without excluding people who are poor and 
vulnerable are the main challenges (Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005; Yates R, 2009). Also 
Gilson (2010) points out that «service delivery is often inequitable, biased towards 
urban areas and hospitals rather than the rural poor; reliance on indirect taxation raises 
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questions of equity; limited tax base provides low level of funding» (Bennett S & Gilson 
L, 2001 ) 
Recommendations: it is urgent to find ways of identifying the poor, ways of 
extending benefits to the poor and demand-side financing (Ranson K, Law T, & 
Bennett S, 2010). 
 
 
II. Health insurance in general 
 
Insurance is a scheme where households make a fixed prepayment in return for 
minimisation or avoidance of uncertain (but potentially catastrophic payment for 
services at the time of need) and where households may pay when they can, reducing 
thus uncertainty and encouraging referrals (Jo Borghi et al., 2006).  
The rationale behind insurance is that it increases the demand for care, 
offsetting market power, alleviating some externalities, and mitigating problems 
associated with misinformation that results in many types of care being underutilized 
(Frick K & Chernew M, 2008). Yet the higher the demand, the higher the financial 
transfers to providers, and the risk of creating distributional issues through moral 
hazard  (Frick K & Chernew M, 2008).  
Challenges: Criticisms of general health insurance systems are that: 
1. Insurance schemes have limited financial sustainability (Borghi et al., 2006). 
Monasch (1998) identifies a study carried out by the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) in collaboration with the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) exploring the range of health insurance schemes available 
to poor people where it is said that «in terms of finance, none of the schemes 
examined appeared to be self-sustaining and most depend on access to some 
form of external subsidy» (Bennett S, Creese A, & Monasch R, 1998). 
2. Insurance schemes lack a policy framework that allocates a place to small 
health insurance projects within the overall health system, which does not 
always allow for pooling across rich and poor people and may lead to increased 
inequalities of provision between different social groups with sometimes 
paradoxically the poor subsidising the rich (Bennett S et al., 1998; Borghi et al., 
2006). 
3. Premiums might not be affordable to poor people, «Insurance schemes struggle 
to reach the poorest people». (Borghi et al., 2006: 1458)  
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4. Additional consumption increases costs and limits coverage expansion (Frick K 
& Chernew M, 2008) 
5. Pregnancy is not a typically insurable risk (Bennett S et al., 1998; Borghi et al., 
2006). 
6. Insurance is sometimes found to increase this risk instead of providing financial 
protection against the possibility of catastrophic payments (Ekman, 2007) 
7. The  interdependence between  insurance  and  the  price  of  care  implies  that 
there  is  more  insurance  and  a  higher  price  of  care  than  would  otherwise 
prevail.  (Feldstein M, 1973) 
8. Insurance only works if some people pay more in contributions than they take 
out in services (Normand C & S., 2008) 
9. «Individuals who know they are at high risk will want insurance and individuals 
who know they are a low risk will consider the contribution too high, so those 
actually applying for insurance are likely to be the more risky cases. This further 
increases the contributions, since contributions must reflect this higher-than-
average risk. In the end, contributions may become unaffordable for many, and 
the insurance breaks down as a financial protection mechanism» (Normand C & 
S., 2008: 163) 
 
 Recommendations: Borghi (2006) argues there is a need for increasing 
government or donor subsidy or both; for cross-subsidising insurance from other 
services; for including delivery care and transport in the insurance package and for 
introducing sliding premiums according to ability to pay or by geographic region (Borghi 
et al., 2006). Sharma (2005) argues for the inclusion of all aspects of antenatal and 
delivery care in the insurance package (Sharma S et al., 2005). For Monasch (1998) 
health insurance schemes must be well-designed and operational in order to increase 
the purchasing power of the poor, particularly in contexts where relatively large 
amounts of money are already spent as out-of-pocket payments in health  (Bennett S 
et al., 1998). For Normand and Thomas (2008), it is necessary to establish conditions 
of membership (e.g. pensioners can only participate if they have been members for 
50% of their working life); to improving waiting periods (e.g. voluntary members must 
have a waiting period before they can claim); and to limit voluntary access (e.g. each 
person has the chance only once in his or her life) (Normand and Thomas, 2008) (See 
Table 9) ( 
 
 
 
52 
 
Table 9: Recommendations for general health insurance 
Issues Addressed Health Insurance 
source (Bennett S et al., 1998; Borghi et al., 2006; Normand C & S., 2008; Sharma S et al., 2005)  
Design 
Delivery care included in package 
Improve insurance schemes so that they include all aspects of antenatal and delivery care.  
Qualifying conditions for membership: For example, pensioners can only participate if they have 
been members for 50% of their working life.  
Waiting periods: Voluntary members must have a waiting period before they can claim. 
Limited voluntary access: Each person has the chance only once in his or her life 
Target the 
Poor/Equity  
Sliding premiums according to ability to pay or by geographic region  
Funding Increase government or donor subsidy or both; cross-subsidy from other services  
Demand Barriers   Transport costs might be included  
 
 
III. Social health insurance 
 
«Social health insurance often operates at the national level, and is compulsory 
among certain segments of the population» (Borghi et al., 2006: 1460). The logic of 
social health insurance is that by reducing financial barriers, it can increase access to 
services generally, and reduce inequities by making these services affordable to the 
poor and other underserved groups (Bellows B et al., 2011). By accrediting many 
providers social insurance guarantees the service at the same price, increases 
competition and enables clients to choose; this increase in competition may thus 
improve efficiency in delivery, promote price reduction and quality increases, since 
providers must be certified (Bellows B et al., 2011).  
Although some authors might argue that social health insurance subsidized by 
taxation at the national level is the best way to fund health care, systems of compulsory 
social health insurance are still little developed in lower income regions of Sub-Saharan 
Africa and struggle to provide compulsory insurance coverage to rural and poor areas 
because of geographic dispersion of households, low incomes, limited formal sector 
employment, and minimal health-care infrastructure (Borghi et al., 2006; Richard F et 
al., 2010) 
 
IV. Community insurance  
 
Community insurance is an attempt to mobilize and manage resources locally 
which provides members with the opportunity to give a flat payment in advance in 
return for free or reduced-cost health care if they get sick (Normand C & S., 2008; 
Poletti T et al., 2007)). Local insurance schemes are proposed as a solution for 
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increasing the utilization of safer motherhood services because they cover the costs of 
all district health centre services increasing women’s ability to pay, when including 
maternity care (Nahar S & Costello A, 1998). Being a local scheme this mechanism 
may create more trust among the population, allowing additional collection of revenue, 
while increasing equitable access to primary health care and improving social 
protection (Normand C & S., 2008; Poletti T et al., 2007).  
Challenges: criticism of general health insurance systems includes: 
1) Low coverage: Community health insurance does not always cover large 
populations and does not always cover main target populations (Bennett S et al., 
1998). This problem is particularly important in terms of maternal health because many 
schemes only cover certain aspects of reproductive care such as risks of 
complications, and few schemes cover costs such as transportation in emergency 
situations (Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005); 
2) Marginalization of the very poor: the poorest populations are left outside since the 
premium is often too high and payment conditions do not favour those with less ability 
to pay  (Bennett S et al., 1998; Bennett S & Gilson L, 2001 ; Borghi et al., 2006; 
Gnawali D et al., 2009; Laterveer L et al., 2004; Poletti T et al., 2007); 
3) Low revenue: local lack of resources may affect the capacity to sustain community 
insurance schemes (Normand C & S., 2008); 
4) Risk management: community insurance schemes face efficiency challenges 
regarding risk sharing, since risk facing individuals are not independent (Normand C & 
S., 2008). The assumption of an insurance scheme is that the healthy pay for the 
expenses of the sick. Yet pregnancy in rural Sub-Saharan Africa occurs very regulary 
for many women in the community and there is a tendency for women to only join the 
schemes when expecting pregnancy (Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005)    ; 
5) Poor management capacity of the community (Richard F et al., 2010) 
6) Others: poor infra-structures, weak linkages with the broader health systems, 
legislation, institutional capacity, resistance to change among certain stakeholders  
(Normand C & S., 2008).  
 
Recommendations: there is a need to subsidize the premium to favor the 
enrolment of the very poor (Gnawali D et al., 2009); to put in place measures  for 
maximizing the population’s capacity to enjoy the benefits of insurance once insured 
(Gnawali D et al., 2009); to cover costs such as transport (Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005); 
to ensure that funding is distributed to the most needy, particular the poor living in non-
urban areas  (Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005); and to improve management systems and 
invest in scheme design (Bennett S et al., 1998) (See Table 10) (S 
54 
 
 
Table 10: Recommendations on Community Insurance 
 
Issues 
Addressed 
Community Insurance 
Source (Bennett S et al., 1998; Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005; Gnawali D et al., 2009)  
Target  the 
Poor/Equity 
Subsidize the premium to favour the enrolment of the very poor 
Ensure that funding is distributed to the most needy, particularly the poor living in non-urban areas   
Management Improve management systems 
Policy 
Framework   
Implement measures in order to maximize the population’s capacity to enjoy the benefits of 
insurance once insured (not only were the very poor less likely to enrol in Community based 
insurance, but even once insured, they were less likely to utilize health services compared to their 
wealthier counterparts)  
Increase transparency and predictability; Invest in scheme design. 
 
V. Conditional Cash transfers  
 
A conditional cash transference is a payment done to the user of a health 
service if he/she accepts to consume that service. The  co-relation between cash 
transfers and maternal health outcomes did not become clear in this review. Some 
studies demonstrate that although overall rate of institutional deliveries may increase, 
the differences are not statistically significant (Lahariya C, 2011). Also Lagarde (2009) 
states that several Conditional Cash Transfer programmes provided strong evidence of 
a positive impact on the use of health services and health outcomes, yet it is hard to 
attribute these positive effects to the cash incentives specifically because other 
components may also contribute (Lagarde M, Haines A, & Palmer N, 2009). However 
many apparently well-designed evaluations strongly suggest that Conditional cash 
transfer programmes could be an effective approach to improving access to preventive 
services and sometimes improving health status (Lagarde M, Haines A, & Palmer N, 
2007; Lagarde M et al., 2009). 
A study in Mexico, about the programme “Oportunidades”, which conditionally 
transfers money to poor rural women to attend antenatal care (ANC) visits and 
reproductive health talks, found that cash transfers influence women's preferences, 
increasing not only their use of services directly linked to the cash transfers, but also of 
other services, such as clinic-based delivery, whose utilization is not obligatory (Sosa-
Rubí SG, Walker D, Serván E, & S., 2011). Other studies from Mexico also show that 
conditional cash transfer programmes are associated with higher caesarean section 
rates in social security and government health facilities, with improved birth weight 
outcomes, and with better quality of prenatal care for low-income, rural women in 
Mexico (Barber S, 2010; Barber S & Gertler P, 2008, 2009). According to them 
“Oportunidades” beneficiaries received 12.2% more prenatal procedures compared 
with non-beneficiaries; had significantly higher caesarean delivery rates in social 
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security facilities (24.0 compared with 5.6% among non-beneficiaries) and in other 
government facilities (19.3 compared with 9.5%); and that beneficiaries’ health status 
was associated with 127.3 g higher birth weight among participating women and a 4.6 
percentage point reduction in low birth weight (Barber S, 2010; Barber S & Gertler P, 
2008, 2009).  
India also launched a national conditional cash transfer program, Janani 
Suraksha Yojana (JSY), aimed at reducing maternal mortality by promoting institutional 
delivery in 2005, providing a cash incentive to women who give birth in public health 
facilities. Studies argue that a large proportion of women delivered under the program, 
with most mothers reporting timely receipt of the cash transfer (Sidney K, Diwan V, El-
Khatib Z, & A., 2012; Vinod P, 2010). They  had a particulary  significant effect on 
increasing antenatal care and in-facility births and that payment was associated with a 
reduction of 3.7 (95% CI 2.2-5.2) perinatal deaths per 1000 pregnancies and 2.3 (0.9-
3.7) neonatal deaths per 1000 live births (Lim S et al., 2010).  
Challenges: reported challenges of Conditional Cash Transfers are the 
following: women who are uneducated, multiparious or lack prior knowledge of the 
programs tend to be significantly more likely to deliver at home; there is a risk of lack of 
awareness about the scheme amongst the general population and beneficiaries; 
procedures  for cash disbursement procedures are sometimes burdensome with 
extensive paper work, the eligibility criteria might be complex; insufficient focus on 
community involvement was a major implementation challenge; political interference 
and possible scope for corruption; poor planning and coordination; situations were 
reported where mothers and babies are discharged within hours after delivery because 
the hospitals lack amenities, and families want to return home having got the cash 
incentive; conditional cash transfers may not be replicable in more deprived settings, 
since they depend on effective primary health care and mechanisms to disburse 
payments  (Lagarde M et al., 2009; Lahariya C, 2011; Lim S et al., 2010; Sidney K et 
al., 2012; Vinod P, 2010). In Nepal the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP) was 
introduced nationwide in 2005 with the intention of increasing utilisation of professional 
care at childbirth. It provided cash to women giving birth in a health facility and an 
incentive to the health provider for each delivery attended, either at home or in the 
facility. Problems at central level imposed severe constraints on the ability of district-
level actors to implement the programme. These included bureaucratic delays in the 
disbursement of funds, difficulties in communicating the policy, both to implementers 
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and the wider public and the complexity of the programme's design (Powell-Jackson T, 
Morrison J, Tiwari S, Neupane B, & Costello A, 2009).  
Recommendations: need for improved targeting of the poorest women and for 
attention to quality of obstetric care in health facilities; for  continued independent 
monitoring and evaluation; for proper training, detailed implementation plan, orientation 
training for implementer, and sufficient budgetary allocation; for improvements in 
community participation; for further rigorous evaluative research in Sub-Saharan Africa; 
and a demand for conditional cash transfers to ensure the stay of the mother baby 
dyad in a facility for at least 48 h after delivery, and for seeking treatment of sick 
newborn babies  (Lagarde M et al., 2009; Lim S et al., 2010; Vinod P, 2010) (See Table 
10)  
 
Table 10: Recommendations on Conditional cash Transferences 
Issues Addressed Conditional Cash transferences  
source (Lagarde M et al., 2009; Lim S et al., 2010; Vinod P, 2010) 
Design 
Demand for conditional cash transfers to ensure the stay of the mother baby dyad in 
a facility for at least 48 h after delivery, and for seeking treatment of sick newborn 
babies   
Target the Poor/Equity  Improve targeting of the poorest women 
Quality Increase attention to quality of obstetric care in health facilities 
Community Improve community participation 
Management Preserve  continued independent monitoring and evaluation 
Funding Guarantee sufficient budgetary allocation 
Other contextual support Conduct rigorous evaluative research in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Previous to implementation/ 
Design/ Planning  
Provide proper training, detailed implementation plan, orientation training for 
implementer 
Demand Barriers   Schemes should cover costs such as transport 
 
VI. Voucher Schemes 
 
A voucher scheme is a financial mechanism that targets specific marginalized 
groups, allowing them to convert the vouchers in exchange for free maternal services 
in health facilities contracted in advanced by the voucher agency. Figure 5 (next page) 
shows the channels through which a voucher system functions: the voucher distributor 
gives the vouchers to the clients who then use these to obtain health services. The 
service provider is then able to use the voucher to obtain reimbursement. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Organization of Voucher Schemes 
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Source: IGES (Janisch C, Albrecht M, Wolfschuetz A, Kundu F, & Klein S, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
Vouchers have been adopted as an innovative mechanism to reduce financial 
barriers and improve access to maternal health services for the poor and especially for 
the poorest of the poor (Abuya T et al., 2012; Ir P, Horemans D, Souk N, & Van 
Damme W, 2010; Killewo J, Anwar I, Bashir I, Yunus M, & J., 2006). Voucher 
programmes provide incentives to improve provider quality, to stimulate patient use of 
selected services, to target services at high-priority populations, and to contain costs 
(Bellows B, Kyobutungi C, Mutua M, Warren C, & Ezeh A, 2012).  «Initial findings from 
the few assessments of reproductive health vauscher  programs suggest that, if 
implemented well, they have great potential for achieving the policy objectives of 
increasing access and use, reducing inequities and enhancing program efficiency and 
service quality» (Bellows B et al., 2011: 2). According to The World Bank, such 
schemes may contribute to quality of care and efficiency, since by offering beneficiaries 
a choice of provider they create incentives to lower prices or raise quality (Sandiford P, 
Gorter A, & M., 2002). «If carefully designed and implemented, vouchers have a strong 
potential for improving access to skilled birth attendants for poor women» (Ir P et al., 
2010: 1).  
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Vouchers schemes for reproductive health date from the 60’s, but more lately 
there has been a renascent tendency for experimenting them again (Bellows B et al., 
2011). In Pakistan voucher intervention implemented for 12 months was associated 
with substantial increases in institutional deliveries (Agha S, 2011). In Kenya, a positive 
association was observed between vouchers and facility-based deliveries in Nairobi 
and findings suggest that increases in facility-based deliveries can be achieved through 
output-based finance models that target subsidies to underserved (Bellows B et al., 
2012). In Bangladesh women from the areas where cash incentives and free access to 
antenatal, delivery, and postnatal care were distributed had a 46.4 percentage point 
higher probability of using a qualified provider and 13.6 percentage point higher 
probability of institutional delivery (Nguyen H et al., 2012). Increased use of maternal 
health services has been reported since the schemes began. Areas for improvement in 
these schemes, identified in this review, include the need for more efficient operational 
management, clear guidelines, financial transparency, plans for sustainability, evidence 
of equity and, above all, proven impact on quality of care and maternal mortality and 
morbidity(Jehan K, Sidney K, Smith H, & Costa A, 2012).  
 Challenges: For Warren (2011) evidence suggests that voucher programs 
functions in different settings, for various reproductive health services delivered through 
public, for-profit or non-profit organizations and that voucher programs positively affect 
the operational efficiency and business model used by service delivery organizations 
and individual providers (Warren C et al., 2011). Yet for other authors there is still a 
need for higher quality evidence and validation in future studies given the  paucity of 
evidence describing how the various voucher programs function in different settings, for 
various reproductive health services and for services delivered through public, for-profit 
or non-profit organizations and how the Vouchers programs affects the operational 
efficiency and business model used by service delivery organizations and individual 
providers  (Bellows B et al., 2012; Bellows B et al., 2011; Borghi et al., 2006; Jehan K 
et al., 2012). Risk of black market and high administrative costs can be a serious 
disadvantage (Borghi et al., 2006). According to Bellows (2012) it remains to be seen 
whether the service is sufficiently cost-effective to scale nationally (Bellows B et al., 
2012). 
Recommendations: authors mention that for effective scale up, strong 
partnership will be required between the public and private entities; the governments 
should include provision of adequate funding, stewardship and look for opportunities to 
utilize existing platforms to scale up such strategies (Abuya T et al., 2012; Ir P et al., 
2010). It is also necessary to increase feedback to providers and information to clients 
on the benefit package; claims processing and reimbursement requires adherence to 
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time consuming procedures; it is necessary to ensure the supply of sufficient quality 
maternity services and to address other non-financial barriers to demand (Abuya T et 
al., 2012; Ir P et al., 2010). (See Table 12) 
 
Table 12: Recommendations on Voucher Schemes 
Issues Addressed Voucher Schemes  
Source (Abuya T et al., 2012; Ir P et al., 2010) 
Quality Ensure the supply of sufficient quality maternity services 
Information/ Comunication Increase feedback to providers and information to clients on the benefit package 
Funding Increase provision of adequate funding 
Policy Making/ Policy 
Framework 
Promote strong partnership between the public and private entities 
Governments should include stewardship and look for opportunities to utilize existing 
platforms to scale up such strategies 
Payment to providers  Claims processing and reimbursement require adherence to time consuming procedure 
Demand Barriers   Address other non-financial barriers to demand; 
 
 
VII. Community Loan Funds 
 
Communities can also set up and administer loan funds for emergency obstetric 
transport and care that work not merely as a life-saving strategy in remote and 
resource-poor health infrastructures, but also as a means to help build trust in the 
health system itself and thus improve sustainability through local institutional support 
(Chiwuzie J , Okojie O, & Okolocha C, 1997; MacIntyre K, 1999). Community-managed 
loan and transport systems for women with obstetric emergencies may contribute to 
reducing delay in obtaining emergency obstetric care, to increasing and to reducing 
case fatality (Ahmed Y, Shehu CE, Nwobodo EI, & Ekele BA, 2004; Essien E et al., 
1997; Fofana P, Samai O, Kebbie A, & Sengeh P, 1997).  
Challenges: limited capacity to generate funds, limited financial sustainability, 
limited management capacity and it is difficult to ensure cash is used for its intended 
purpose (Borghi et al., 2006; Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005).  
Recommendations: sustaining the funds over the long term requires 
continuing effort and involvement with the communities dependent on strong 
community leadership and requires substantial mobilization efforts (Chiwuzie J  et al., 
1997; Fofana P et al., 1997) (See . 
 
Table 13: Recommendations on Community Loan Funds 
Issues Addressed Community Loan Funds  
Source (Borghi et al., 2006; Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005). 
Communities Improve community leadership and mobilization 
Funding Sustaining the funds over the long term 
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VIII. DISCUSSION 
 
1. User fees do not work for maternal care in rural Sub-Saharan Africa 
What is the purpose of user fees in a health system with low demand, where 
insurance is not widespread and where price is not zero? 
User fees were set because in theory when the price is zero (i.e. when a 
service is free), people tend to consume infinite amounts of care. At the time when co-
payments were introduced in high income countries, like the United States, there was 
widespread offer of medical care, leading to excesses of demand called moral hazard.  
In this type of setting, where medical care insurance is widely available, if health 
services are free or modestly priced at the point of contact, there is no incentive to limit 
demand because either the insurance company or the state pays it can therefore be 
opportune to limit consumption through a price barrier.  
That is why user fees make sense. However, the case of maternal care in rural 
Sub-Saharan Africa is different because: (1) demand by definition is depressed, not in 
excess; (2) coverage systems are neither functional nor fully available; and (3) the 
price of maternal care in these settings is not zero. 
A review by Eldis Health and Development Information Team concludes that 
frivolous use is unlikely to occur on a large scale in developing countries due to barriers 
such as geographical access, as it usually already requires the woman to be informed 
enough to identify of her health condition and to prioritize her needs before choosing to 
consume (IDS, 2012).  
In fact, the total price of maternal health care for women living in a rural Sub-
Saharan includes many extra costs like transportation and food expenditure at the 
treatment site, and opportunity costs, like the loss of daily income, time spent travelling 
great distances, and sacrifice of other essential goods and services such as food or 
children’s education (Meessen B et al., 2006).  
It could be argued that in High Income Countries people also have costs not 
covered by any insurance system (like transportation, time, distance and income) and 
that these people also have to make sacrifices. Yet road condition, quality of 
transportation and budget constraints of women living in Sub-Saharan Africa are not 
comparable with an average women living in a High Income Country. 
To a woman living in High Income Country these costs may represent a total 
price close to zero, while to a woman living in rural Africa the total cost of maternal care 
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is inestimably higher than their purchasing power and constitute a barrier for health 
care consumption.  
Therefore, if a price is set for controlling excess of demand and (1) women in 
rural Africa are already paying an enormous price for maternal care and (2) maternal 
care is underused, why is reproductive healthcare in rural Africa being additionally 
charged? And why impose a barrier in a service that is essential, risking high 
socioeconomic externalities? 
Given the importance of having healthy women in developing countries, and 
knowing that user fees were conceived as a mechanism to control excessive demand, 
it makes no sense to additionally charge services that are already being highly priced 
and where price constitutes an extra barrier for poor women to consume maternal care. 
Moreover, no study was found proving an effective reduction of frivolous demand 
caused by the introduction of user fees. 
In the words of Yates (2009), «we should have known in the context of 
improvement of health outcomes and reduction of poverty that taking money from poor 
people when they are sick is not a good idea» (Yates R, 2009: 2081). 
 
i. A “lose lose situation” 
When poor people are price sensitive user fees make them leave the health 
system, and when poor people are price insensitive user fees lead them to sacrifice. 
Generally the demand for health care by poor people is price sensitive 
(Meessen B et al., 2006). In 1990, Germano Mwabu, from the Population and Human 
Resources Department of The World Bank, stated precisely that the poor have higher 
elasticity than non–poor and recognized that if prices were significantly increased poor 
people would move out of the health care system and rely on traditional medicine 
(Mwabu G, 1990: 4).  
According to him, «if patients are very sensitive to costs of medical care, 
implementation of user fees could cause a large reduction in utilization of health 
services». In the same document Mwabu also describes what happens when poor 
patients are insensitive to prices of medical care: «they sacrifice other basic necessities 
to obtain health care… But their sacrifices would not be desirable from the perspective 
of society»(Mwabu G, 1990: 4).  
In this report the author clearly states that user fees may create large 
inequalities in health care and that «charging for primary health care services in a poor 
region is potentially welfare reducing». Howeveruser fees still suggested as a potential 
option for improving health outcomes. Two things may be concluded:  
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1) Independently of the elasticity to maternal care of rural Sub-
Saharan women, user fees lead to a “lose lose” situation where either they 
restrain their consumption of an essential and lifesaving service or they risk 
sacrificing other essential goods and services; 
2) The World Bank predicted the detrimental effects of this policy 
on people’s lives, yet underestimated their impact due to theoretical 
assumptions.  
 
ii. What if user fees do not impact maternal care utilization? 
Although several authors mention that user fees produce a negative impact on 
utilization and despite the conceptual and ethical arguments discussed above, an 
extensive review by the World Health Organization, assessing the quality of the 
existing evidence on the impact of user fees on health service utilization in low- and 
middle-income countries, found limited evidence that «the introduction of user fees 
decreases utilization in the form of one sharp reduction» and that «this effect extends 
beyond this initial drop» (Lagarde M & Palmer N, 2008). 
 If this is true, more accurate studies could be undertaken on the impact of user 
fees on utilization of maternal care. However, why weren’t these studies undertaken 
prior to a large scale suggestion for and implementation of this mechanism? «It should 
not be acceptable to make claims for any benefits from user fees when the basic 
underlying conditions do not exist for their introduction; where doing so has predictable 
negative impacts» (Poletti T, 2004). 
Moreover, as discussed above, even if user fees do not directly decrease the 
utilization of maternal health services they may impact people’s consumption of other 
essential goods and services when demand for care is inelastic. Studies on the impact 
of user fees on demand for maternal care should thus take into consideration this 
cross-effect.  
 
iii. User fees do not raise enough money, which limits quality 
improvements 
Another conclusion from Lagarde’ study (2008), also reached by many different 
pro fee authors, is that «the combination of user fees and improvements in quality can 
increase utilization» (Lagarde M & Palmer N, 2008).  
In most of the rural Sub-Saharan African countries revenues are very low and 
the little money potentially collected is not enough to raise health care quality 
standards.  
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Because the price is raised and quality is not significantly improved, the effect 
of user fees utilization is different from the one presented by Brítan (2002). When 
quality improvements are minimal the effect of price exceeds their effect on demand, 
thus quantity demanded after fee may reach lower levels than quantity demanded 
before. 
If fees have a detrimental effect on utilization, this will be reflected in total 
revenue through a lower collection of funds, and that may transport suppliers to a 
worse-off position than the one prior to the introduction of user fees, especially when 
we add high fee administrative costs. 
This raises two questions: the first is what level of user charge would be 
appropriate to attain enough revenue?  The second is how much revenue would have 
to be collected in order to address necessary quality improvements? 
It can be argued that no matter what the level of fees, the contribution of user 
charges is relatively insignificant when compared to the level of revenue needed for 
scaling up maternal health in rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa.  
However, it can also be argued that because quality is really scarce, no matter 
how small the revenue generated by user fees is, little improvements may have great 
impact. Yet, so far, the combination of user fees and improvements in quality was only 
registered in few countries, particularly located in Asia. Therefore it would be 
interesting to analyse why countries like Cambodia and Vietnam were so successful at 
improving quality and demand in comparison to most of Sub-Saharan Africa. Also, it 
may be that another financing mechanism was used to attain the improvements in 
quality, particularly when the effects on demand are so uncertain. 
 
 
iv. How functional is the collection of funds? 
Another key element of user fee revenue is the point of collection of funds. On 
one hand, in systems where fees are collected centrally (like in countries which 
adapted a standard model of user fees to cross-subside rural areas, to promote 
decentralization and to favour price coordination) it has been difficult to ensure that 
revenues reach health facilities and it has also been noticed that there is little effort to 
collect the fees at facility levels. Also most of the evidence points to the fact that cross-
subsidizing between regions does not happen and that fees contribute to increasing 
geographical disparities. 
On the other hand, in systems where the Bamako initiative (BI) was 
implemented (mainly in francophone African countries to promote local community 
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management) attendance at the tertiary level tends to be reduced and fee waivers are 
reported to be infrequent (Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005). «Experience suggests that locally 
generated funding, such as user charges is often used to substitute for a lack of regular 
budget funding and leads to little net increase in resources. As a consequence there is 
no funding left to improve quality» (Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005: 56). (See Table 15 in 
appendix) 
In both models of implementing user fees in Sub-Saharan Africa the collection 
of funds has not been functional. 
 
v. User Fees are not the key for solving referral problems  
 
The ability of fees to improve the referral system is one of the biggest 
arguments for the standard model of user fees in Sub-Saharan settings. Yet studies 
analysed did not contain very detailed proof of the impact of user fees on referral 
system and registered several unsolved issues which, when addressed together, could 
have a greater impact than user fees alone. Communities do not know the functional 
differences between a hospital and a clinic; people still have to pay high prices for 
transport and other indirect costs when visiting tertiary level health facilities; 
communication between services and users is often not effective; although referred 
patients do not pay for hospital consultation fees once admitted the patient still has to 
pay or prove he/she is eligible.  
User fees may instead lead to delays in treatment and more severe cases, and 
recourse to other treatment options which are less effective (IDS, 2012). Therefore 
studies should be done to understand how efficient respect for the maternal care 
referral systems could be promoted among rural Sub-Saharan women without harming 
equity.   
 
vi. User fees work against the poor 
 
Evidence shows that above all user fees are not working for the poor but 
against them. Maternal user fees are being applied in communities where almost all 
women are very poor. Therefore if exemptions were functional, user fees would be 
minimal and mostly work as a discretionary measure for those few who could pay for 
health in rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa. Not the contrary, as we see today. 
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vii. User fees cannot be seen as a first best solution 
 
In order to protect the interests of the poor and marginalised people that 
account for the majority of rural Sub-Saharan Africa, in these settings the introduction 
of user fees should never be understood as a first best solution for solving the problem 
of scarce maternal health. On the contrary, charging out-of-pocket expenses can only 
be seen as a complementary means to “top-up” potential excess of demand, which is 
not the case for most of the region under study. 
 
 
2. Key recommendations for a well-functioning maternal health system in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
 
i. Asking the wrong questions 
 
One of the problems of the health mechanisms that have been put into practice 
is that the right questions have not always been raised. 
 If the question is how to increase efficiency in the health system, should  
policies not start by ensuring appropriate allocation of resources among essential 
packages of health services; by developing cost-effectiveness analysis; by improving 
management practices; by prioritizing health-sector activities to meet the prevailing 
disease burdens in each country (where maternal health plays a large role); and by 
training health personnel to provide more accurate care? If the question is how to 
increase revenue, should efforts to look for funding not focus on how those who have 
more resources can contribute, instead of asking the poorest to pay? If the question is 
how to improve the referral system, should governments not start by educating 
populations on how it works instead of fixing a price expecting them to learn by force? 
Increase quality is essential because if better maternal care services are offered 
demand for care increases (Akashi H et al., 2004; Dao H et al., 2008; Sepehri A et al., 
2005). «One of the key ways in which financing reform may improve the access of the 
poor to health  care  is  through  improving  the  quality  of  care  of  publicly  funded  
(and  potentially privately funded) services.» (Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000: 13) 
However there are alternative and more effective ways of improving services, such as 
the adoption of guidelines and procedures to promote revenue use for perceived 
quality improvements, that do not affect poor consumers (Gilson L, 1997). 
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 Supply side mechanisms are not appropriate to solve demand side problems – 
for  instance marginal changes in provider payments (supply) have a limited effect on 
utilization (demand) (Gauri V, 2001) – as demand side interventions, like limiting 
consumers’ ability to pay, are not appropriate for solving supply side problems related 
to quality and efficiency. Instead, supply-side policies are the preferred   instruments for 
cost control (Ellis R & McGuire T, 1990). «If  cost  is  a  problem,   the  first  question   
that   should   be  asked  is,  “what  can  be done   with   the  provider    reimbursement     
system3?”, rather   than   the  traditional “how  can  insurance   benefits  be  reduced?”» 
(Ellis R & McGuire T, 1990: 394).  
Recommendations on provider payment schemes suggest the need to ensure 
that these mechanisms cover average production costs for each provider type and that 
payments to facilities are either made in advance, based on predicted caseload, and 
adjusted periodically, based on reports, or paid retrospectively to avoid cash-flow 
problems (Abuya T et al., 2012; Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Ir P et al., 2010; Loveday 
Penn-Kekanaa, 2007; Sophie Witter, 2008). 
 
 
ii. Asking the right question 
From the experience of user fees in maternal health it can be learned that when 
choosing a health financing mechanism the first question which has to be raised is 
“Does that precise mechanism improve the demand?” and along with the answer two 
assumptions must be made: 
a) If the answer is negative the mechanism should be set aside; 
b) If the answer is positive there is a need to improve the supply of 
maternal care so that it faces both actual demand and the 
additional demand. 
 
iii. How prepared can an inelastic and deprived supply be for an 
increased consumption? 
Most of the hospital and health centres in rural Sub-Saharan Africa already lack 
enough quantity and quality of human and capital resources to provide adequate care 
                                               
3 Reimbursement systems are payment schemes   that have achieved   the desired   
balance   between   protecting consumers from   financial   risk and controlling are 
characterized by generous   insurance   coverage and financial   incentives   for 
providers to control costs.   
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for all births that presently take place. Some areas have less than 10% of the 
requirements in terms of adequately trained health professionals and have 
underequipped health facilities (Borghi et al., 2006). 
Additionally, supply in rural Sub-Saharan Africa has slow response capacity. In 
rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa, it takes time to ensure drug distribution, contracting 
of staff, purchasing of equipment or construction of infra-structure, which makes any 
increase in demand experience a natural delay in response from suppliers.  
Because of these two factors any mechanism that promotes a higher demand in 
maternal health care may cause a dreadful overloading of services, unless preventive 
measures are taken. 
 
iv. Poor women cannot pay for maternal health care 
The cost of delivering health care to poor women in rural Sub-Saharan Africa 
will always entail total or partial subsidization:  
«The  very  poor  are  unable  to  make  any  significant  
financial  contribution  for  health services: governments must 
secure health care financing for them, and particularly for  their  
use  of  hospital  care,  either  through  direct  payment  from  tax  
revenues  or cross-subsidies in insurance-based systems.» 
(Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000: 15) 
 
«The cost of delivering reproductive health services to 
low-income populations will always require total or partial 
subsidization by the government and/or development partners.» 
(Bellows B et al., 2011: 2)  
 
All mechanisms analysed predict that low income women should have free 
access to maternal care. In the user fee system this is done through exemptions; in 
insurance systems, when the premium is too high, those who cannot pay are 
subsidized; in a universal coverage system health care is free; in a voucher or cash 
transference system the poor are paid to consume.  
This poses two main issues:  
 
1) Who is going to pay for these subsidies?  
This again entails the need of extra funding in maternal health care. 
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2) How to ensure that funding is distributed to the most needy, particular 
the poor living in non-urban areas? 
 Ensuring that funding is distributed to the neediest women firstly requires 
awareness of who they are, which entails the implementation of functional targeting 
mechanisms, in articulation with local communities, a measure which: 
a) Produces realistic measurements of household resources available for maternal 
care; 
b) Distinguishes poor from the non-poor; 
c) Is feasible to implement at the local level; 
d) Considers the impact on poor women and households of the total mix of financing 
mechanism; 
e) Favours relatively under sourced geographical areas.  (Bennett  S & Gilson L, 
2000; Gilson L, 1997; Loveday Penn-Kekanaa, 2007; Sophie Witter, 2008) (See 
Table 14 in appendix) 
 
v. How to address other non-financial barriers to demand? 
Critics suggest the scope for additional demand-side investments, such as in 
transport funds, should be considered alongside supply-side approaches, in specific 
areas of need (Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Borghi et al., 2006; Ensor T & Ronoh J, 
2005). «Poor  people’s  access  to  health  care  is  often  constrained  by  low  quality  
care,  high transport  costs,  long  waiting  times  and  inconvenient  opening  hours.  
Financial reforms,  which  deliver  improvements  in  these  dimensions  of  quality  at  
a  moderate price, particularly in relation to hospital care, will probably benefit the 
poor» (Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000: 16) (See Table 14 in appendix). 
 
vi. Overcoming corruption 
Corruption is a transversal and undermining factor of dysfunctional health 
services in Low and Middle Income Countries particularly affecting the scaling up of 
reproductive care in Sub-Saharan Africa. Suggestions for overcoming it are the 
following: 
a) Improve professional ethics to counterbalance health workers’ 
responsiveness to financial incentives 
b) Avoid the capture of exemptions by non-poor groups such as civil servants 
c) Introduce appropriate financial incentives to deter the risk of informal 
charges (like monitoring health facilities with checks to ensure that costs are 
not being shifted onto other services or into informal payments). (Bennett  S 
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& Gilson L, 2000; Borghi et al., 2006; Gilson L, 1997; Loveday Penn-
Kekanaa, 2007; Richard F et al., 2011; Sophie Witter, 2008) (See Table 14 
in appendix). 
 
vii. Management  
 
a) Improve management skills and systems 
- Develop skills and systems to enable decentralization of resource use, 
control and management within a wider system to an appropriate level; 
- Develop management-oriented information systems which allow monitoring 
by providing data on, for example, revenue collected, revenue use patterns; 
- Provide training in financial skills to the people working in the health care 
system so they are able to estimate costs, set prices, and bill the schemes 
in a timely manner  
- Capacitate local programme managers to continuously make programme-
improving adjustments 
b) Provide appropriate incentives 
- Introduce appropriate financial incentives to ensure infrastructural capacity 
to manage increased demand 
- Introduce appropriate financial incentives to counteract over-medicalization 
c) Promote best practices in monitoring and supervision 
- Develop effective management and clinical supervision (timely monitoring 
should pick up and respond to problems, but also flag up successes to 
generate continued financial support); 
- Develop clear lines of responsibility (both institutional and individual) for 
managing and monitoring the policy implementation process; 
- Preserve continued, periodic and independent monitoring and evaluations 
against these guidelines (that take in consideration baseline indicators such 
as: cost escalation, utilisation, quality of care,  household costs, and health 
outcomes including maternal mortality and caesarean rates); 
- Develop effective audit procedures to ensure accountability and support at a 
local level (district or community); 
- Maintain activities record-keeping that allows for independent verification of 
cases managed; 
- Documented. learning lessons and detail related to the process when 
evaluating programmes (Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Bennett S et al., 
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1998; Borghi et al., 2006; Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005; Gnawali D et al., 2009; 
Lagarde M et al., 2009; Lim S et al., 2010; Loveday Penn-Kekanaa, 2007; 
Richard F et al., 2011; Sophie Witter, 2008; Vinod P, 2010) (See Table 14 in 
appendix). 
  
viii. Communication   
 An primary challenge that financial health schemes often face is the inadequate 
level of publicity of policies which limits information delivery to the people in need, who 
by nature tend to be the most “info excluded”. The consequence is that «poor maybe 
deterred from using health services because of uncertainty about how much  they  cost  
and  the  potential  embarrassment  of  not  being  able  to  pay» (Bennett  S & Gilson 
L, 2000: 12).Overcoming lack of policy communication may also lead to encourage 
public debate  and create a feedback that informs policy development (Bennett  S & 
Gilson L, 2000).  
 Some suggestions are to increase the information to clients and to health 
workers on the benefit package, keeping core messages as simple as possible; to 
improve the feedback to providers; and to ensure the price structure is advertised 
within healthcare facilities. (Abuya T et al., 2012; Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Gilson L, 
1997; Ir P et al., 2010; Loveday Penn-Kekanaa, 2007; Sophie Witter, 2008) (See Table 
14 in appendix). 
 
ix. Improving policy framework 
Improving policy framework has high positive externalities and is an essential 
step in the path towards improving health care quality,  developing financial health 
systems and implementing organization reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa and in a sector 
typically closed, confined  to  discussions  between  an  elite  group  of  bureaucrats,  
politicians  and external adviser (Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000). Recommendations for 
improving policy frameworks range from a political spectrum, to concrete health sector 
reform proposals, to generation of consensus among stakeholders, policy design, 
planning and implementation, capacity building and research development: 
 
a) Political spectrum 
- Governments should include stewardship and look for opportunities to utilize 
existing platforms to scale up such strategies, concede funding and provide 
regulatory  and  policy frameworks for the various forms of financing; 
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- International agencies and technical advisors need to give “advice” more 
circumspectly; 
b) Health sector reforms 
- Develop institutional capacity within health systems to provide support to local 
level decision makers; 
- Increase transparency and predictability; 
- Develop a supportive legal framework for fee/sustainability policies; 
c) Consensus generation 
- Ensure all key stakeholders are consulted and involved in development of the 
policy (e.g. policy guidelines communicated to all key stakeholders) 
- Promote strong partnership between the public and private entities and wider 
institutional support (e.g. banking facilities; communication facilities); 
- Ensure that the exemption system is given high priority by politicians and 
bureaucrats alike; 
- Engage with potential ‘champions’, who can sustain the policy momentum 
nationally and sell the policy politically;  
- Involve implementers in designing policies; 
d) Policy Design 
- Develop complementary risk-sharing financing mechanisms; 
- Guarantee that policy is consistent with the wider policy environment and 
thinking in government; 
- Ensure policy guidelines are clearly elaborated;  
- Ensure programmes are defined locally in space and time (i.e. not once-and-
for-all but on a continuous basis of re-evaluation); 
e) Capacity Building 
- Provide detailed implementation plan and orientation training for implementers; 
- Develop technical skills within each country for  the designing of pro-poor 
financing reforms; 
- Draw technicians  into policy-making in appropriate ways; 
- Develop adequate leadership and advocacy skills within the health sector to 
develop political support for appropriate design and policy; 
f) Research development 
- Develop thorough situation analysis of the main barriers to increasing skilled 
delivery; 
- Document and share country experiences focussing not only on costs  and  
outcomes,  but  also  on  the  processes  which  enabled  policies  to  be 
sustained and to be effective; 
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- Develop evaluative research in Sub-Saharan Africa; 
d) Planning  
- Develop good prior estimates of financial and other resources needed, taking 
into account an increase in the patient load, a willingness to enforce the policy 
by frontline staff, and to ensure good implementation (policies should be 
carefully and realistically costed – based on utilisation  patterns, caseload, unit 
costs, and projected changes to these – and matched with likely funding 
sources)  
- Invest in scheme design;  
- Financing  reforms  should  be  carefully  phased,  both  so  as  to  build  upon  
existing capacity  and  to  ensure  proper  fit  between  different  elements  of  
the  reform. (Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Bennett S et al., 1998; Borghi et al., 
2006; Chiwuzie J  et al., 1997; Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005; Fofana P et al., 1997; 
Gnawali D et al., 2009; Lim S et al., 2010; Loveday Penn-Kekanaa, 2007; 
Ranson K et al., 2010; Richard F et al., 2011; Sophie Witter, 2008)  
 
x. Context matters 
Authors are unanimous – the context in which the policy operates matters and 
is determinant when choosing a financial mechanism for maternal care in 
heterogeneous rural sub-Sahara (Borghi et al., 2006; Chiwuzie J  et al., 1997; Ellis R & 
McGuire T, 1990; James C et al., 2006; Meessen B et al., 2006; Normand C & S., 
2008; Parkhurst J et al., 2005; Pauly M, 1968; Powell-Jackson T et al., 2009; Richard F 
et al., 2010; Witter S et al., 2007).  
For instance, this three-country study of health reforms and maternal health 
(Loveday Penn-Kekanaa, 2007) shows how context is important and how the key to 
understanding challenges in implementation lies in complex and dynamic responses of 
health workers and community members to policies and programmes. The study 
compares maternity services in Bangladesh, Russia, South Africa and Uganda and 
concludes – «the devil is in the detail... details are what studies of maternity services 
need to focus on, so that patterns can be deduced and strategy tailored to take account 
of responses that have been observed in other studies» (Loveday Penn-Kekanaa, 
2007: 34).  Here an example: «a programme may be defined as “training midwives” or 
“expanding skilled birth attendance”, but it will have incorporated a wealth of detailed 
components – a recruitment strategy, a consultation strategy, a training curriculum, a 
group of trainers and trainees, an incentive regime, a management team and an 
information system, among others – that need to be analysed, defined and monitored. 
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Details cannot be copied from other existing programmes because the individuals 
involved cannot be reproduced, and geographical terrain and population distribution 
are not identical. This is because context matters.» (Loveday Penn-Kekanaa, 2007: 
34).  
Another study brought to light by Bennett (2007) shows how in practice political 
pressures may  prevent  shifts  in  resource  allocation  to  the  poor,  and  limited  
government capacity may hinder the effective implementation of exemption schemes to 
protect the  poor,  or  may  prevent  the  promised  gains  in  quality  of  care  from  
actually materialising (Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000) 
Yet, despite the recognition of the impact of context on the design, 
implementation and choice of financial schemes in general and maternal health in 
particular, «the critical importance of these factors to outcome is not reflected 
adequately in the policy advice currently being offered, or given the attention in official 
reports and publications that it deserves.» (Loveday Penn-Kekanaa, 2007: 34). 
To overcome this, measures should be taken, in addition to the ones already 
cited in policy framework section, for making mechanisms adaptable in response to 
local circumstances. Such as:  
 
a) Involve the community in decision making  
- Encourage broader consultation with groups representing and working with the 
poor, such as non-governmental organisations, religious organisations and other 
specific interest groups; 
- Consider how complementary players, such as Traditional Birth Attendants,  can be 
involved in the policy in a constructive way; 
- Build community  consensus about the desirability, rationale and direction of reform 
b) Improve mechanisms design  
- Develop community management mechanisms at a primary level which ensure 
accountability to community and can assist the poor; 
- Encourage  exemption  screening  to  take  place  close  to  the  household  in  the 
community  or  local  health  care  facility  through  mechanisms  that  involve  both 
community members and health workers and by individuals trained for the task; 
- Develop periodic community-based surveys to assess actual benefits of the policy 
for different socio-economic and geographical groups; 
c) Develop capacity building 
- Develop capacity building actions within the community to improve community 
participation and build strong community leadership capable of substantial 
mobilization of efforts  (Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Chiwuzie J  et al., 1997; 
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Fofana P et al., 1997; Gilson L, 1997; Lagarde M et al., 2009; Lim S et al., 2010; 
Loveday Penn-Kekanaa, 2007; Sophie Witter, 2008; Vinod P, 2010) (See Table 15 
in appendix). 
 
xi. Model for Understanding the context of a low demand 
Pro-poor financing mechanisms can only be developed on the bases of a 
comprehensive understanding of the circumstances, needs, constrains and potentials 
of the poor (Meessen B, 2006, Pauly, 1968, Sarah Bennett, 2000). For the general 
understanding of the factors underlining the lack of formal maternal healthcare demand 
in Sub-Saharan, a dynamic responsive model, which gives account of the obstacles for 
households assessing care, was developed (See Figure 6).   
Based on the previous works of Witter (2008), Penn-Kekanaa (2007), Gilson 
(1997) and Samuelson (2005) this model explains how De facto and De Jure Systems 
interact both with the dynamic responses of rural women and the communities in Sub-
Saharan African, as well as with the organization of the health system, in order to 
cause a depressive demand. It was conceived as a proposal to guide researchers and 
project managers in the development of the solutions that may contribute to an 
increase of the use of maternal health services in specific contexts. This model is to be 
understood as a flexible and dynamic framework, which can be applied in different 
contexts; in other words, it conveys the necessary tools to adapt the maternal health 
system to different communities, spaces and times, on the basis of the analysis, 
identification and respect for the local beliefs, habits and needs.  
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Figure 6 Dynamic Responsive Model: Barriers For Women Assessing Care In Rural Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
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Quality 
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referral system. 
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Dynamic 
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Illegal selling of drugs 
Informal Behaviours 
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76 
 
xii. Appling the model in a real context 
 
To give an example of how the transposition of the model into reality could be 
done a region of Sub-Saharan Africa was selected, namely the Kwale district in Kenya. 
Kenya is situated in the eastern part of the African continent The country is divided into 
8 provinces and 158 districts (KNBS and ICF Macro, 2010). Maternal health indicators 
in Kenya have been slightly but not enough over the years but not significantly and the 
mortality rates are still high(UNICEF, 2012b, 2012c; UNICEF WHO UNFPA & 
Guttmacher Institute, 1997).The causes of maternal death are identified: they above all 
directly related to unsafe abortion, pregnancy, and obstetric complications such as 
severe bleeding, infection, obstructed labour and hypertensive disorders (UNDP).  
Kwale, one of the poorest districts in Kenya, is situated on the Coast Province, 45 
kilometres south of the city of Mombasa city, in the South-Eastern corner of Kenya and 
borders the Indian Ocean to the East and Tanzania to the South (USAID, 2012). The 
district has 6 Divisions, 37 Locations, and 86 Sub-Locations and a resident population 
of 566,887 persons (Roschanski H, 2007). The estimated number of women of 
reproductive age is 37,548, the estimated number of pregnancies is 6,258 annually 
(USAID, 2012). 50% of the deliveries are not medically assisted (USAID, 2011). The 
maternal mortality rate in the district is considerably higher than the national estimate 
(USAID, 2011) (For more information on attendance to maternal health services in 
Kenya, Coastal province and Kwale district consult Graphic 1, 2 and 3 in appendix).
  
 
(A) Factors linked to women and communities  
 
1. De facto systems  
a. Access: In Kenya only around 22% of the population lives in urban areas (78% 
of rural population) and Kenya’s economy is predominantly agriculture (Roschanski H, 
2007; UNDP). Agriculture is the main economic activity of Kwale and the distribution of 
rainfall is very unequal across the district which sets populations to be very susceptible 
to food crises, floods, droughts, etc (Roschanski H, 2007). In Kwale the poverty index 
is 63%, with estimated number of 657,139 persons living below the poverty line 
(Roschanski H, 2007) which causes the ability to pay for healthcare to be very low. In 
the district Women have a low social status and suffer lack of empowerment. Lack of  
security, low availability of public transport at night or other barriers may prevent 
mothers from seeking a facility delivery  (Bellows B et al., 2012) 
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b. Quality: Still 70% of people in the district don’t have access to improved health 
sanitation facilities and only 60% have access to improved water sources which 
undermine the conditions of homebirths and traditional birth attendant’s services 
(Roschanski H, 2007).  
 
2. De jure systems 
a. Organizational structures: Semi-trained private providers, like traditional birth 
attendants, dominate the supply of health care in most rural and marginal urban areas 
(Gauri V, 2001). These providers often engage in agricultural or other activities part-
time, and have limited contact with the formal, public health care system (Gauri V, 
2001). 
 
3. Dynamic Responses 
a. Informal structures: Private providers utilize a mix of Western and indigenous 
medical concepts and make money purchasing and reselling drugs from local chemists 
(Gauri V, 2001). As these practitioners work by themselves and isolated from others, 
they avoid referring their patients to other colleagues or doctors or asking for their 
opinions. They are afraid of losing their patients, in case they should prefer the 
colleague or the doctor. (Gauri V, 2001) 
b. Informal behaviours: Low attendance to health services and high level of 
home deliveries, with no kind of skilled birth assistance, still observed in Kenya, are 
also compromising the health outcomes (Ziraba AK, Madise N, & Mills S, 2009). 
Patients don’t respect the referral system and go directly to emergency rooms and 
hospital outpatient centres (Gauri V, 2001). 
c. Informal relationships: Patients are usually uninsured and pay providers 
informal out-of-pocket, resulting in substantial household outlays (Gauri V, 2001).  
 
(B) Factors linked to the organization of maternal health care system  
1. De facto systems  
 
a. Access: In Kenya there is a national policy for charging maternal health 
services (See Table 16). 
 
Table 16: The price of Maternal Health Services in Kenya 
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Source: International Centre For Reproductive Health, Kenya (ICRH) Data: 2012. 
 
Service/ Items 
 
Price in Kenyan shillings 
(Ksh) 
 
Price in Euro 
(€) 
1- Dispensary flat fee for  service 10 0,1 
2- Health Centre flat fee for  service 20 0,2 
3- Referral from primary health  facility (distance 
dependent) 
130/liter 1,2/liter 
4- District Hospital 
Minor surgery 200 1,8 
Major surgery including  caesarean section 3600 32,7 
Bed charges 100/ day 0,9/day 
ANC card 20 0,2 
Vaginal examination 50 0,5 
Normal delivery 500 4,5 
Removal of stitches 30 0,3 
Injections 40- 60 0,4/0,6 
Stitching 200 1,8 
Minor dressing 50 0,5 
Incision and drainage 200 1,8 
Ultrasound 500 4,5 
Nebulization 100 0,9 
Common drugs 30 0,3 
Special drugs/ Antibiotics 50-200 0,5-1,8 
ANC/ FP/MCH services Free 
HIV testing Free 
 
b. Quality: Kwale distric suffers from inadequate logistical support, inadequate 
staff with limited skills, rude equipment’s and weaken supply of services (National 
Coordination Agency for Population and Development, 2005).  
 
2.  De jure systems 
a.        Organizational structures: The health expenditure per capita is less than 
US$40, quite below the average of the WHO African Region, which is above US$80 
(Bellows B et al., 2012). There is a lack of wide spread third-party payment and of 
private hospitals, most having weak information systems for reporting treatment 
quantities and marginal costs (Gauri V, 2001). The public health system is organized in 
a classical health pyramid structure where six delivery levels can be found. The first-
level of care, at the base of the pyramid, is provided at the community level, the second 
level comprises the dispensaries and the third level includes the health centres; the 
fourth, fifth and sixth levels, include respectively, district hospitals provincial hospitals 
and referral hospitals  
b. Management procedures: in this context cost-comtainment was easily 
achieved by shrinking the public sector health budget Budgetary caps are ham-fisted 
instruments that force facilities to ration care arbitrarily, creating confusion, distrust, 
patient dumping, and steadily eroding the credibility of government incentives for 
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providers (Gauri V, 2001). There is little or no transfer of medical information between 
the hospital and their local clinic or health centre (Gauri V, 2001). 
c. Indented incentives: Authorities of the health care policies in the National 
Development Strategy, Vision 2030, Kenya called for the creation of a mandatory 
National Health Insurance Scheme, for the improvement of output-based approach 
system, and for the promotion of access to health care for disadvantaged groups in 
order to promote equity in Kenya’s health care financing (Bellows B et al., 2012). 
Complementary public health sector reforms are underway in the Health Sector 
Services Fund (HSSF). They are intendet to for complementing output-based voucher 
reimbursements to facilities and, furthermore, to normalize efficient decision-making at 
the service provider level (Bellows B et al., 2012). 
d. Dynamic Responses: There is a wide spread of informal payments (Gauri V, 
2001). 
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Figure 7: Dynamic Responsive Model: Barriers For Women Assessing Care In Kwale  
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xiii. There is no perfect solution 
 
A maternal health financing mechanism will never solve all the problems in the 
roots of a low demand and a fragile supply of formal maternal health care in rural Sub-
Saharan Africa and the search for a perfect, unique and holistic solution should not 
guide any investigation. Caution is therefore required not to fall into theoretical traps 
that threaten realistic and, above all, effective approaches.  
It is also difficult to assess whether or not a single financing mechanism is pro-
poor. Improving maternal health in low income settings depends on a complete mix of 
solution in which financing mechanisms and their interaction with resource allocation 
approaches and organisational contexts must be considered (Bennett  S & Gilson L, 
2000).  
Finally ,based on the previously presented model and in the typology of 
recommendation created before, it was possible to design a scheme to accede to the 
available types of financing mechanisms, enabling their interaction with De facto 
systems, with De Jure Systems and with the dynamic responses of rural women and 
communities in Sub-Saharan African (See Figure 8).  
 
 
 
  
82 
 
Figure 8 Mix of financing mechanisms for improving women assessing maternal health care in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
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xiv. Project proposal  
Ultimately from this thesis results a proposal for a project in the field for 
undertake a future deeper exploration of the theme here developed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problem addressed: Although we can expect a negative correlation between price 
and demand for formal maternal care, few studies have done a systematic analysis to 
measure the effective impact on demand of changes in the costs of formal maternal 
care. And there are even fewer studies where this analysis is done  in  respect  to  the  
influence  of  cultural  factors  on  women’s  responses  to these changes, particularly 
in low income settings.    
 
Proposed solution: Undertake a case study that fills this gap and explains how price 
influences the demand for formal maternal healthcare in different cultural settings in 
low income regions.   
 
Location: This project was design to be undertaken in low income settings. Yet, this 
proposal shows how it could be developed in the field, taking Kwale District in Kenya, 
as an example.   
 
Development objective: Increase efficiency and effectiveness in the choice of 
financial mechanisms that increase the demand for maternal healthcare in  low income 
settings.   
 
Immediate  Objectives:  (1)  Understand  if  a  price  decrease  leads  women  to 
significantly  consume  more  formal  maternal  health  care;  (2)  Understand  how big 
is the difference (in terms of utilization) between setting a zero price from paying  
women  to  consume  formal  maternal  healthcare;  (3)  determine  how women  from  
different  cultural  backgrounds,  living  in  the  same  area,  react  to changes  in  the  
price  of  formal  maternal  healthcare;  (4)  conclude  if  different maternal healthcare 
services have different demand price elasticities4.   
                                               
4 This project could be implemented for a comprehensive package of maternal health services or it could focus on a 
specific momentum like antenatal care, intra-partum or postpartum period. The evaluation of postpartum maternal care 
 
The influence of price in the demand for maternal healthcare among 
different rural Sub-Saharan cultural settings 
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Table 17 Project Hypothesis and outcomes 
Hypothesis Outcomes 
[H0] (S1/2) had no substantial impact on the utilization of formal maternal care 
consumption what is s1/2? 
[H1] (S1/2) had a positive impact on the utilization of formal maternal care  
Impact of price on the utilization of 
formal maternal care 
[H0] (S1/2) had no substantial impact in the demand for other goods and 
services  
3[H1] (S1/2) had a positive impact on t4he utilization and on the demand for 
other goods and services 
Impact of decreasing price in the 
demand for other goods and services 
[H0] Different groups have similar price elasticity 
[H1] Different groups have different price elasticity 
Price elasticity of different groups 
[H0] Different formal maternal healthcare services have similar price elasticity 
[H1] Different formal maternal healthcare services have different price 
elasticity 
Price elasticity of different formal 
maternal health services 
[H0] The impact on demand of setting a zero price is not significantly different 
than the impact of offering payments to women 
[H1] The impact on demand of setting a zero price is significantly different 
than the impact of offering payments to women 
[H1.a] The impact in demand of setting a zero price is bigger than the impact 
of offering payments to women 
[H1.b] The impact in demand of setting a zero price is bigger than the impact 
of offering payments to women 
Impact of different demand side 
financing mechanisms in the demand 
for formal maternal healthcare of rural 
Sub-Saharan women 
 
Expected  Results:  (1)  General  assessment  on  the  influence  of  price  in  the 
demand for maternal healthcare in the analysed setting; (2) Assessment on the effect 
of  a decrease  in  price  in  the  demand  for  other  goods  and services;  (3) 
Assessment of the influence of cultural factors in the demand price elasticity of poor  
women;  (3)  Improved  comprehension  on  the  impact  of  two  different demand  side 
financing  mechanisms  in  the demand for maternal healthcare  in low income settings; 
(4) Assessment on the demand price elasticity of different formal maternal healthcare 
services.   
 
Projects beneficiaries: Research community; populations that directly receive 
improved maternal healthcare services in low income settings.   
  
 
Project Work plan: Project working plan can be seen in the following table. 
 
Table 18 Project Working Plan 
Phase Procedure Methodology 
Preparation 
1 
Access the potential effects of price in the demand for maternal health 
care 
Literature 
Review 
2 
Identify:  
1) A set of cultural variables that is most likely to influence the 
demand for maternal care 
2) A set of cultural group profiles in Kwale district 
Qualitative 
Research;  
Literature review 
3 
 
Explore the most feasible mechanisms for 
1) Simulating a situation where maternal healthcare services 
are given for free (S1) 
2) Simulating a situation where maternal healthcare services  
are given for free and women receive extra financial 
Qualitative 
Research 
                                                                                                                                         
could be a particularly interesting option since few studies  focus  on  this  period  and  there  is  a  growing  evidence  of  
the  impact  of  postpartum interventions on maternal and neonatal outcomes. 
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incentives if they consume (S2) 
4 
Choose two different groups among those cultural group profiles to participate in the case 
study (for example one group of Akamba people and another of Durumba people) 
Implementation 
5 
 Characterize the actual situation (S0), assessing for the two groups: 
1) The patterns of formal maternal care utilization  
2) The consumption patterns of other goods and services  
Cross-sectional 
Study 
6 Implement (S1) 
7 Evaluate the effect of  exposing the two groups to a zero price 
on utilization of formal maternal care consumption 
on the demand for other goods and services consumptions 
Cohort Study 
8 Assess how differently the two groups react to (S1) (measure the price 
elasticity of each group) 
Cross-sectional 
Study 
9 Implement (S2) and follow the same procedure 
  
xv. Strengths and limitations of thesis 
a) Strengths 
- The method adopted to store data ensured efficient and consistent articulation 
of information; 
- The systematic method adopted for classifying and organizing articles led me to 
a clear scheme of patterns and recommendations that per se resulted in an innovative 
and comprehensive model of analysis of the effect of cultural barriers on the demand 
for formal maternal healthcare in rural Sub-Saharan Regions. And not only is 
demonstrated how the suggested model could be used to study specific contexts 
through a practical example; as it is explained the value of such kind of approaches for 
studding the potential mixes of mechanisms of financing maternal health care in low 
income settings. 
- While most of the studies produce sets of recommendations adapted to a specific 
financial mechanism, this study was able to gather recommendations from all 
different schemes and to produce a unique typology. 
- The presented thesis also resulted into a project proposal in the field developed for 
a deeper future exploration on the impact of financial mechanisms in the demand 
for maternal healthcare in rural settings of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
- Finally from undertaking this research I learned how to approach a similar study in 
the future. 
b) Limitations 
- As a novice researcher my approach to the identification, critique and bringing 
together of the literature may not have been as thorough as that of more 
experienced researchers; 
- Time limitations did not allow me to explore the available literature more 
extensively; 
- Resource restrictions narrowed the thesis to a theoretical discussion, which 
would have benefited from experience in the field.  
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IX. CONCLUSION 
 
If exemptions and waiver systems were effective, if providers were adequately 
compensated for the revenue forgone, if there was no corruption, if revenue collected 
from user fees could contribute significantly to improving the quality of healthcare and 
to motivating staff and increasing hospital’s supplies, if governments were more 
collaborative and if management practices were better, perhaps user fees could 
promote a higher demand for maternal health care in rural Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, 
these ifs are far from being met and from matching with reality, at least not with the 
current reality in most of (Sub-Saharan or Low Income) countries. The implementation 
of user fees was developed as a mechanism for limiting excess demand. However 
there is little evidence that it works in contexts where demand is scarce without 
harming equity. In this thesis, we have shown that user fees can be harmful in a 
context were women are very poor and where services have suboptimal levels of 
consumption. 
The right questions must be raised in order to find effective solutions for 
improving women’s health conditions and their household lives. The first question to 
ask is what can work in order to promote a higher demand for qualified healthcare. 
Alternatives to out-of-pocket expenses must be considered. Demand side approaches 
like voucher schemes, community insurance, cash transfers and loan funds, as well as 
options like universal coverage and social health insurance exist. Also remodelling a 
further set of available and interrelated tools – by  improving management skills, 
refining information systems, adopting anti-corruption measures, investing in project 
design, and promoting community participation in decision making processes – should 
favour women’s access to maternal healthcare in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, all these tools may fail if context is not taken into account. The search 
for the right solution has to be preceded by a comprehensive analysis of the context 
and an identification of the problem. It is necessary to understand the cause for the 
lack of demand for maternal healthcare and keep in mind that the reasons for the 
arousal of the problem may be different from community to community.  
This thesis is expected to have contributed to this very precise point, both 
describing some strategies for the assessment to the community, the identification of 
the problem and its analysis, and proposing some strategic solutions for the benefit of 
women and the maternal healthcare in rural Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Moreover, new avenues must be explored in order to clear some issues, such 
as the role of price and culture together regarding the consumption of formal maternal 
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health services in low income settings. It is not clear how the introduction of negative or 
zero prices in maternal healthcare influences women's consumption of other goods and 
services; and it is not clear if demand elasticity varies across different maternal 
healthcare services and across cultures. These aspects will be explored in further 
studies.  
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XI. APPENDIX  
 
 
 
Table 5: Classification of household costs by place of delivery  
Source: (Borghi J, 2008) 
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Table 6: Expenditures incurred by households giving birth in a government 
hospital (in USD) 
Source: (Borghi J, 2008) 
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Table 15. Typology of recommendations by issues addressed 
 
Issues 
address
ed 
Source Recommendations 
Target 
the 
Poor/Eq
uity  
(Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Gilson L, 1997; 
Loveday Penn-Kekanaa, 2007; Sophie Witter, 2008) 
Implementation of functional targeting mechanisms, in articulation with local communities, which 
produces realistic measurements of household resources available for maternal care; 
distinguishes poor from the non-poor; is feasible to implement at the local level; considers the 
impact on poor women and households of the total mix of financing mechanism and favours 
relatively under sourced geographical areas. 
Corrupti
on 
(Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Borghi et al., 2006; 
Gilson L, 1997; Loveday Penn-Kekanaa, 2007; 
Richard F et al., 2011; Sophie Witter, 2008) 
Improve professional ethics; avoid the capture of exemptions by non-poor groups such as civil 
servants; introduce appropriate financial incentives to deter the risk of informal charges. 
Quality 
(Abuya T et al., 2012; Gilson L, 1997; Ir P et al., 
2010) 
Ensure revenues retained at the point of collection are used in quality improvements; develop 
guidelines; ensure the supply of sufficient quality maternity services. 
Coordin
ation/ 
Referral  
(Gilson L, 1997; IDS, 2012) 
Coordinate the price structure across health system levels; ensure communities understand the 
functional differences between a hospital and a clinic.  
Commu
nity 
(Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Chiwuzie J  et al., 
1997; Fofana P et al., 1997; Gilson L, 1997; Lagarde 
M et al., 2009; Lim S et al., 2010; Loveday Penn-
Kekanaa, 2007; Sophie Witter, 2008; Vinod P, 2010) 
Involve the community in 
decision making 
Encourage broader consultation with groups such as non-
governmental organisations and religious organisations; consider 
how complementary players can be involved in the policy making; 
build community consensus. 
Improve mechanisms 
design  
 
Develop community management mechanisms at a primary level 
which ensure accountability; encourage  exemption  screening  to  
take  place  close  to  the  household  in  the community  or  local  
health  care  facility  through  mechanisms  that  involve  both 
community members and health workers and by individuals 
trained for the task; develop periodic community-based surveys. 
Develop capacity building 
 
Develop capacity building actions within the community to improve 
community participation and build strong community leadership 
capable of substantial mobilization of efforts 
Staff 
(Borghi et al., 2006; Gilson L, 1997; Richard F et al., 
2011) 
 
Implement an effective reward and discipline system for health staff, including training; Introduce 
appropriate financial incentives to ensuring sufficient staff  
 
Drugs 
(Borghi et al., 2006; Gilson L, 1997; Richard F et al., 
2011) 
 
Develop effective drug procurement and supply system; Increase government funding to avoid the 
risk of shortages of drugs and medical supplies 
 
Manage
ment 
(Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Bennett S et al., 1998; 
Borghi et al., 2006; Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005; 
Gnawali D et al., 2009; Lagarde M et al., 2009; Lim S 
et al., 2010; Loveday Penn-Kekanaa, 2007; Richard 
F et al., 2011; Sophie Witter, 2008; Vinod P, 2010) 
Improve management skills 
and systems 
Develop skills and systems to enable decentralization; develop 
systems which allow monitoring by providing data; Provide 
training; Capacitate local programme managers to continuously 
make programme-improving adjustments. 
Provide appropriate 
incentives 
Introduce appropriate financial incentives to ensure infrastructural 
capacity to manage increased demand and to counteract over-
medicalization. 
Promote best practices in 
monitoring and supervision 
Develop effective management and clinical supervision; clear lines 
of responsibility; preserve continued, periodic and independent 
monitoring and evaluations against guidelines; develop effective 
audit procedures and activities of record-keeping; documented. 
learning lessons  
Informati
on/ 
Commu
nication 
(Abuya T et al., 2012; Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; 
Gilson L, 1997; Ir P et al., 2010; Loveday Penn-
Kekanaa, 2007; Sophie Witter, 2008) 
Increase the information to clients and to health worker; keep core messages; improve the 
feedback to providers; ensure the price structure is advertised   
Funding 
Guaranty minimum injections of financial resources for ensuring sufficient staff, an effective reward and discipline system of health personnel, and an 
effective drug procurement and supply system; increase donor and governmental investments 
Policy 
Framew
ork 
(Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Bennett S et al., 1998; 
Borghi et al., 2006; Chiwuzie J  et al., 1997; Ensor T 
& Ronoh J, 2005; Fofana P et al., 1997; Gnawali D et 
al., 2009; Lim S et al., 2010; Loveday Penn-Kekanaa, 
2007; Ranson K et al., 2010; Richard F et al., 2011; 
Sophie Witter, 2008) 
Political spectrum: Include stewardship and look for opportunities to utilize existing platforms to 
scale up such strategies; concede funding; provide regulatory  and  policy frameworks for the 
various forms of financing; give “advice” more circumspectly 
Health sector reforms: Develop institutional capacity; increase transparency and 
predictability; develop a supportive legal framework. 
Consensus generation Ensure all key stakeholders are consulted and involved in 
development of the policy; promote strong partnership between 
the public and private entities and wider institutional support; 
ensure that the exemption system is given high priority; engage 
with potential ‘champions’; involve implementers in designing 
policies. 
Policy Design Develop complementary risk-sharing financing mechanisms; 
guarantee that policy is consistent with the wider policy 
environment and thinking in government; ensure clear policy 
guidelines; ensure programmes are defined locally in space and 
time.  
Capacity Building Provide detailed implementation plan and orientation training for 
implementers; develop technical skills for the designing of pro-
poor financing reforms; draw technicians; develop adequate 
leadership and advocacy skills within the health sector.  
Research development Develop thorough situation analysis of the main barriers to 
increasing skilled delivery; document and share country 
experiences¸ develop evaluative research.  
Planning: Develop good prior estimates of financial and other resources 
needed; willingness to enforce the policy by frontline staff, and to 
ensure good implementation; invest in scheme design; carefully 
phase financing reforms.  
Reimbur
sements 
(Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000) 
Ensure a payment mechanisms should ensure that average production costs and that those 
payments to facilities are made in advance, based on predicted caseload, and adjusted 
periodically, on reports, or paid retrospectively but frequently.  
Demand 
side 
approac
hes 
(Bennett  S & Gilson L, 2000; Borghi et al., 2006; 
Ensor T & Ronoh J, 2005). 
 additional demand-side investments, such as in transport funds 
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Graphic 1: Antenatal Care first and 4th visit  
Source: International Centre For Reproductive Health, Kenya (ICRH)   
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Graphic 2: Family Planning Attendance in Kenya and Coastal province 
Source: International Centre For Reproductive Health, Kenya (ICRH) 
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Graphic 3: Number of Deliveries in Kwale Country 
Source: International Centre For Reproductive Health, Kenya (ICRH) 
 
